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FOUR TERMS OF THE KENNEDY COURT: PROJECTING
THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
Kenneth M. Murchisont

Typically, observers of the United States Supreme Court identify
the Court by the name of its Chief Justice. Thus, articles and books
often refer to the Marshall Court, the Taney Court, the Taft Court,
and the Warren Court, to mention only a few of the most famous.
The basis for the identification is undoubtedly the special position the
Chief Justice enjoys as the first among a court of equals. 1 In
conference, the Chief Justice speaks first and votes first after the
discussion is completed. 2 In addition, a Chief Justice who is part of
the majority chooses the author of the majority opinion. 3 Perhaps not
surprisingly, Chief Justices are often members of the majority in
important cases and frequently choose themselves to author the
Court's opinions. 4
t

1.

2.

3.

4.

James E. and Betty M. Phillips Professor at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of
Louisiana State University (B.A., 1969, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; J.D., 1972,
University ofVirginia; M.A., 1975, University of Virginia; S.J.D., 1988, Harvard Law
School). I presented a preliminary version of this Article at the 2007 meeting of the
Megan
Southeastern Association of Law Schools at Amelia Island, Florida.
Streetman, my research assistant, provided valuable assistance in locating the
materials on which this Article is based.
See G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The NineteenthCentury Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1463, 1465-66 (2006) (discussing the role of the
Chief Justice and his personification of the Court).
See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 215 (7th ed. 1998). Until
sometime in the 1970s, the Court followed a somewhat different procedure in which
the Chief Justice spoke first but voted last. That method arguably gave the Chief
Justice even greater influence because the Chief Justice always knew the precise
division of the Court when casting the final vote. See id. at 215 n.126.
See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978) (demonstrating when a
Chief Justice used his power as Chief Justice to assign a majority opinion to himself).
For a brief description of how Chief Justice Burger voted and assigned the opinion in
the case, see KENNETH M. MURCHISON, THE SNAIL DARTER CASE: TV A VERSUS THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 125-26 (2007).
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701,
708 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995)
(Rehnquist, C.J.); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974) (Burger, C.J.);
Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954) (Warren, C.J.); Shelley v. Kraemer,
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The ideological division of the current Court justifies a
modification of this tradition. Recent appointments to a sharply
divided Supreme Court have made Associate Justice Anthony
Kennedy the critical vote on most important constitutional issues that
divide the Court. Thus, at least for the present, the appropriate label
for the contemporary Supreme Court appears to be the Kennedy
Court rather than the Roberts Court.
This Article describes how Justice Kennedy came to be the most
important Justice and offers a preliminary evaluation of the influence
he is likely to have on constitutional doctrine in the coming years. It
begins with a brief description of how the recent appointments have
accentuated Justice Kennedy's influence and a summary of the
impact that Justice Kennedy had on constitutional doctrine prior to
the recent changes in the makeup of the Court. The next two sections
describe how the Court's recent decisions demonstrate the central
hypothesis that Justice Kennedy is now the ideological center of the
Court and highlight areas where Justice Kennedy's vote might be
crucial for a change in doctrinal direction. The final analytic section
examines three factors that might operate to limit the increased
influence of Justice Kennedy in the future. The conclusion offers an
early assessment of likely changes in the constitutional doctrine of
the future.
I.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND

During the 2005 Term, new Justices joined the United States
Supreme Court for the first time in more than a decade. 5 Most
commentators expected the appointments of Chief Justice John
Roberts 6 and Justice Samuel Alito 7 to move the Court further to the

5.

6.
7.

334 U.S. I, 4 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,311
(1945) (Stone, C.J.); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. I, 22 (1937)
(Hughes, C.J.); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 34 (1922) (Taft, C.J.);
Standard Oil Co. ofN.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 30 (1911) (White, C.J.); United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9 (1895) (Fuller, C.J.); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544 (1875) (Waite, C.J.); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S.
533, 536 (1869) (Chase, C.J.); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 399 (1856) (Taney,
C.J.); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
Justice Stephen Breyer, the last Justice appointed before Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, took his seat on August 3, 1994. The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/aboutlbiographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2008) [hereinafter The Justices of the Supreme Court].
President George W. Bush nominated Chief Justice Roberts. Jd. Following Senate
confirmation, he took his seat on September 29, 2005. !d.
President Bush also nominated Justice Alito. !d. Following Senate confirmation, he
took his seat on January 31, 2006. !d.
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right and thus to shift the ideological balance of a Court whose
decisions had completely satisfied no one. 8 Supporters of the New
Deal legacy criticized the rise of new federalism restraints on the
ability of Congress to deal with national problems. 9 Devotees of the
Warren Court deplored the shrinking of the rights of criminal
defendants 10 and minorities, 11 and the expanded protection for
economic interests. 12 If any disciple of Justice Frankfurter's judicial
restraine 3 still existed, she undoubtedly lamented the expansion of
Supreme Court power in a variety of directions; an expansion that
culminated in the Court rather than Congress resolving the disputed
presidential election of 2000. 14 Even the new conservatives-who
won the majority of victories during the last decade before the
appointment of Chief Justice Roberts-were dismayed by the Court's
failure to overrule Roe v. Wade 15 or to outlaw all race-based
affirmative action programs, 16 the continuing limits on the ability of

8.
9.

10.

II.

12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

See infra text accompanying notes 9-19 (demonstrating discontent among the Justices
through various concurring and dissenting opinions within key cases).
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
See, e.g., Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177 (1990). But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
(describing an expanded interpretation of what facts the Sixth Amendment requires to
be decided by a jury).
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993).
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., joining dissenting opinion of
Harlan, J.); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 114 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For
the suggestion that Justice Frankfurter was more ardent than consistent in his
advocacy of judicial restraint, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 409 (2002); Harold 1.
Spaeth, The Judicial Restraint of Mr. Justice Frankfurter-Myth or Reality, 8
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 22 (1964).
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see generally THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST
ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM 267 (2004) (stating that most legal scholars would not have described
presidential vote counting as an area oflaw for the Supreme Court).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,846 (1992).
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,251 (2003); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.
234, 237 (2001).

4

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

states to impose capital punishment, 17 and the expanded protections
afforded to women 18 and homosexuals. 19
Few observers thought replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist with
Judge John Roberts of the District of Columbia Circuit would
produce any dramatic shift in the Court's decisional pattem. 20
Instead, they assumed that the new Chief Justice, like his
predecessor, would generally side with Justices Scalia and Thomas
on ideologically divisive issues. 21
The appointment of Judge Samuel Alito of the Third Circuit to
replace Justice O'Connor was a different matter. Despite having
been appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Justice O'Connor had
been a centrist on the Rehnquist Court on several crucial issues. 22 By
contrast, most observers expected Justice Ali to to align himself more
closely with the new Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
thus increasing the size of that ideological grouping to four. 23
When the new Justices vote as expected, the obvious impact of the
shift in the Court's membership is to increase the influence of Justice
Anthony Kennedy. Although Justice Kennedy joined the ScaliaThomas bloc with some frequency in recent years/ 4 he often backed
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002).
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,519 (1996).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 635-36 (1996).
See, e.g., Kelly S. Terry, Shifting Out of Neutral: Intelligent Design and the Road to
Nonpreferentialism, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 67-69 (2008).
See, e.g., DavidS. Cohen, Justice Kennedy's Gendered World, 59 S.C. L. REv. 673,
673 (2007).
See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 358 (2006) (holding that states
are subject to proceedings to recover alleged preferential transfers); Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 512 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of
access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress's authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (holding that
diversity in law school is a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 918 (2000) (holding that a statute banning partial
birth abortions was unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 841 (1992) (holding that the undue burden test should be used to evaluate
abortion regulations). See Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The
Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1300-07
(2004), for an analysis of Justice O'Connor as a centrist.
See Cohen, supra note 21.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 710 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 147 (1992).
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away from the most extreme positions that those two Justices
endorsed. 25 As a result, he shared the Court's center with Justice
O'Connor from 1995 to 2005. 26 Each (or both) of them occasionally
slowed the rightward drift of the Court by joining with Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to create a more left-leaning
majority. 27 Now that Justice Alito is expected to be a more consistent
part of the ideological bloc on the right, Justice Kennedy's position
becomes even more important. When he joins Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, he creates a majority for the
right wing of the Court. When he joins the other four Justices, he
creates a majority with the more liberal Justices.
As noted above, Justice Kennedy shared the center of the Court
with Justice O'Connor throughout the 1990s and the first five years
of the new century. As a result, he contributed to alterations of the
landscape of constitutional doctrine in a wide variety of areas. In
many of these cases, Justice Kennedy articulated a position that
significantly qualified the majority that he joined. 28 The remainder of
this section first summarizes some of these areas and then describes
them in more detail.
Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor most commonly joined with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to form a
majority for constitutional change. 29 That majority reinvigorated
federalism limits on congressional power, 30 established the Equal
Protection Clause 31 as a restraint on affirmative action programs and
state election procedures/ 2 and strengthened the Takings Clause 33 as
25.

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S.
at 843 (Kennedy, J., joint author of plurality opinion); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy's views were even more influential in the early and middle years of
the 1990s. Between the 1991 Term and the 1997 Term, he dissented only forty-three
times in 667 cases that the Court disposed of by signed opinion. Earl M. Waltz,
Anthony Kennedy and the Jurisprudence of Respectable Conservatism, in REHNQUIST
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 140, 140 (Earl M. Waltzed., 2003).
See, e.g., Rasul v. Bash, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 623 (1996).
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
See infra Part I.A.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
See cases cited il?fra notes 110-11.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
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a limit on state regulatory power. 34 At the same time, it narrowed the
scope of a woman's right to choose an abortion,35 the rights of
criminal defendants, 36 and some First Amendment claims. 37
Less frequently, Justice Kennedy (either by himself or with Justice
O'Connor) formed a majority with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer or their predecessors. Those majorities
reaffirmed a woman's right to choose an abortion/ 8 provided
substantial protection for women under the Equal Protection Clause, 39
declined to invalidate all race-based afflrmative action, 40 confirmed a
broad congressional power to adopt comprehensive federal statutes,41
and broadly defmed what constitutes a "public use" under the
Takings Clause. 42
Finally, Justice Kennedy also provided the decisive vote in some
cases when the Court divided on less ideologically predictable lines.
Two ofthe most important areas decided by such majorities involved
the dormant Commerce Clause as a restriction on state regulation of
economic activity43 and substantive due process as a limit on punitive
damages in tort suits in state courts. 44
A.

Federalism Issues

Some of the most significant decisions of the Rehnquist Court
concerned the extent to which federalism restrains the powers of
federal and state government. Justice Kennedy often provided a
crucial vote in delineating these limits.
Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor joined with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in a series of decisions
that narrowed congressional authority to regulate private conduct. In
1995 and 2000, Justice Kennedy joined opinions by Chief Justice
Rehnquist denying congressional power to regulate "noneconomic"
activities because of their aggregate effect on interstate commerce, 45
although in the 1995 case his concurring opinion stressed the
continued breadth of congressional power under the Commerce
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See cases cited infra notes 105, 145-51.
See cases cited infra notes 121-23.
See cases cited infra notes 156--60.
See cases cited infra notes 172-74.
See cases cited infra notes 118-20.
See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
See cases cited infra notes 135-39.
See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
See cases cited infra notes 153-55.
See cases cited infra notes 76-77.
See cases cited infra note 127.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 60(H)1 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550--51.
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Clause. 46 Justice Kennedy also authored the opinion invalidating
Congress's attempt to use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
require strict scrutiny for state actions that substantially burden an
individual's free exercise of religion, 47 and he joined opinions finding
that Congress lacked power under the Fourteenth Amendment to ban
trademark and patent infringement by states48 or to prohibit
discrimination against those who are disabled49 or elderly. 5°
Indeed, Justice Kennedy would have imposed stricter limits on
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment than a
majority of the Supreme Court eventually established. He sided with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in dissent
when Justice O'Connor joined Justice Stevens's opinion holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to grant damages
against states that failed to make reasonable accommodations for the
disabled to attend court. 51 He also joined Justices Scalia and Thomas
in dissenting from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to extend the Family
Medical Leave Act to states. 52
Justice Kennedy was also decisive in marking an important
qualification to the decisions limiting congressional authority. In
2005, he sided with the Justices who had dissented in the cases
limiting federal power and joined a decision that refused to extend
those decisions, by requiring that comprehensive statutes create
exceptions for localized activity. 53 Unlike Justice Scalia who
concurred only in the judgment in that case, 54 Justice Kennedy joined
the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens. 55
Justice Kennedy played an equally pivotal role in the cases
recognizing new state immunities from federal regulations. He
joined Justice O'Connor's opinion holding that Congress could not
force New York to enact a low-level nuclear waste law that met

46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,511,534-36 (1997).
Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647-48 (1999).
See Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,374-76 (2001).
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 65, 82-83 (2000).
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,538 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I, 3, 32-33 (2005).
/d. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
/d. at 3.
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federal standards. 56 He also joined Justice Scalia's opinion declaring
that Congress could not require local law enforcement officials to
participate in the implementation of the federal statute that mandated
background checks for gun purchases. 57
Justice Kennedy's role was especially prominent in the decisions
establishing state immunity from private actions for damages. He
joined in opinions58 ruling that states were immune from private
actions for damages in federal courts when those actions were based
on statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause 59 and the Copyright
and Patent Clause. 60 He also authored the opinion holding that the
immunity applied to claims brought in state court as well as those
filed in federal court61 and joined the opinion extending the immunity
to adjudications by federal agencies. 62
Perhaps surprisingly for a Court that tried to rein in federal power,
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist frequently
concluded that valid federal law preempted additional state
regulations. 63 The Court invalidated most of these state laws by

56.
57.
58.

59.

60.

61.
62.

63.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 147, 149 (1992).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,900,932-35 (1997).
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 65, 82-83 (2000); Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 667, 691 (1999); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 629,
647-48 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... ").
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ").
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1999) (holding that states are not subject
to private suits in state courts for claims under the Fair Labor Standard Act).
Fed. Mar. Comrn'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 746-47 (2002) (holding
that the same principles of dignity and respect due to a state sovereign that bar suit in
court against a state apply to bar administrative adjudications).
See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 142-43 (2001) (holding that the Federal
Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) preempted state statutes that provided
that divorce automatically revoked the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a
"nonprobate asset"); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 116 (2000) (holding that the
Federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act preempts state tanker regulations that
addressed general navigation watch procedures, English skills, training, and casualty
reporting); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 74 (1997) (holding that federal election law
preempts state statutes setting dates for open primary for election of United States
senators and representatives); Doctor's Assoc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996)
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts special notice provisions in state
arbitration acts); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 28 (1996) (holding that federal
banking law preempts state statutes that forbid banks from selling insurance in small
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substantial majorities of which Justice Kennedy was a part of. 64
Justice Kennedy dissented only once in the preemption cases 65 and in
the one case when the Court divided five to four, he was a member of
the majority. 66
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided the first in a series of
important preemption cases considering when federal regulatory
statutes precluded private actions for damages under state law. 67 The
1992 decision was a fragmented one in which the Court concluded
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted
certain failure-to-warn claims, but not claims based on express
warranty, intentional fraud, misrepresentation, or conspiracy. 68
Justice Kennedy joined Justice Blackmun's concurring and dissenting
opinion that also would have allowed the failure-to-warn claims. 69
Since 1995, the Court has addressed the issue of preemption of
private remedies in a steady stream of cases. The decisions vary,
depending on the particular federal statue involved. The Court has
found that some federal statutes preempt state claims/0 but that others

64.

65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

70.

towns). But see Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S.
440, 442 (2005) (holding that a federal statute establishing single state registration
system does not preempt a state licensing fee of $100 for trucks operating entirely in
interstate commerce). The Court has been especially willing to find preemption when
the state claim impacted foreign commerce or international relations. See Am. Ins.
Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (holding that federal law preempts
state's holocaust victim insurance relief act because the state law interfered with the
President's conduct of foreign affairs); Crosby v. Nat'! Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (holding that federal law imposing sanctions against Burma
preempts state statutes that restricted the ability of the state and its agencies to
purchase goods or services from companies that did business with Burma).
See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 365-66 (unanimous decision); Locke, 529 U.S. at 94
(opinion by Justice Kennedy, for a unanimous Court); Foster, 522 U.S. at 68, 74
(unanimous decision except that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas did not join in
Part III of the Court's opinion); Doctor's Assoc., 517 U.S. at 682-83 (eight-member
majority with Justice Thomas dissenting).
Mid-Con Freight Sys., Inc., 545 U.S. at 456 (Kennedy, J., dissenting joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor).
Am. Ins. Ass 'n, 539 U.S. at 400.
See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516-20 (1992).
!d. at 530-31. For a contemporary assessment of Cipollone, see Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., Product Liability-Cigarettes and Cipollone: What's Left? What's Gone?, 53 LA.
L. REV. 713 (1993).
See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 531, 543-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring
in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (outlining the difficulties that trial courts
would face in implementing the decision).
Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 213-14 (2004) (holding that ERISA
preempts claims under the Texas Health Care Liability Act); Beneficial Nat'! Bank v.
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2003) (finding that the National Bank Act provides an
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do not. 71 Significantly, Justice Kennedy was a member of the
majority in all twelve cases that involved claims of preemption of
private remedies, 72 including two cases in which the Court divided
five to four on the issue. 73
When the federalism questions shifted to state power, Justice
Kennedy was more willing to imply federalism limits on state
legislative power than the group with which he generally sided. 74 In a
case from Arkansas, he agreed with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer that the Constitution prohibits states from

71.

72.

73.
74.

exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks); Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352-53 (2001) (holding that the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act preempts state law claims that a regulatory consultant made
fraudulent claims to the Food and Drug Administration); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866-67 (2000) (holding that the National Traffic and Motor Safety
Act preempts a District of Columbia tort claim that a manufacturer was negligent in
failing to equip automobile with driver's side airbag); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1999) (holding that ERISA preempts state rules
allowing employers of policyholders to be deemed agents of insurers for group
insurance plans); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998)
(holding that the Federal Communications Act preempts state law claims for breach of
contract and tortious interference with contract).
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 432, 444, 453 (2005) (holding that the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act does not preempt state claims for
defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, breach of express warranty,
or violation of state Deceptive Trade Practices Act; failure to warn claims should be
referred to courts of appeals for further analysis); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537
U.S. 51, 70 (2002) (finding that the Federal Boat Safety Act does not preempt
common law tort claims arising out of failure to install propeller guards on boat
engines); Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213,227-28 (1997) (finding that the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act does not preempt state
negligence standards in liability actions against former officers and directors of
federally insured savings institutions); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500-01
(1996) (holding that the Medical Device Amendments do not preempt claims based on
state or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements
imposed under federal law); Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215-16
(1996) (finding that the judicial recognition of federal maritime wrongful death
actions does not preempt the application of state wrongful death and survival statute
to accidents in which non-seamen are injured in territorial waters); Freightliner Corp.
v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,289-90 (1995) (holding that the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act does not preempt state law claims for personal injury sustained in
vehicle collisions).
Bates, 544 U.S. at 433; Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 202; Beneficial Nat'/ Bank, 539
U.S. at 2; Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 521; Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 342; Geier, 529 U.S.
at 863; UNUM Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 526 U.S. at 362; Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 534 U.S. at
215; Atherton, 519 U.S. at 215; Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 472-74; Yamaha Motor
Corp., 516 U.S. at 201; Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 281.
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 863; Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 472-74, 500-01.
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779,781 (1995).
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limiting the number of terms a representative or senator can serve in
Congress. 75 Similarly, he has found fairly stringent limits on state
regulatory power in the dormant Commerce Clause, although the
Court's division has been less ideologically predictable on that
issue. 76 In one important case, his opinion for a divided Court ruled
that a local waste management ordinance requiring that all waste in
the county be delivered to a single privately owned transfer station
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 77
B.

Separation ofPowers Questions

Justice Kennedy consistently voted with the majority in separation
of powers cases, 78 but the majority in many of those cases was a
substantial one. He joined the unanimous opinion that rejected
President Clinton's claim that he was entitled to a temporary
immunity from private lawsuits while serving as President. 79 He was
also part of a six-member majority that invalidated the Line Item
Veto Act. 80 In the latter case, he added a concurring opinion
declaring that "the [f]ailure of political will [in limiting federal
spending] does not justify unconstitutional remedies." 81
When the Court faced the issue of standing to invoke the federal
judicial power, Justice Kennedy frequently provided a centrist vote.
He joined the major decisions of the Rehnquist Court constricting

75.
76.

77.
78.

79.
80.
81.

Jd. at 783, 837-38.

Another example of a five to four decision in which Justice Kennedy provided the
decisive fifth vote for the majority is Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). In
Granholm, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion concluded that state statutes allowing
only in-state wineries to ship wine directly to consumers discriminated against
interstate commerce and violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 544 U.S. at 466.
For other cases in which Justice Kennedy joined larger majorities recognizing limits
based on the dormant Commerce Clause, see Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 566, 572-77 (1997); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 94, 100 (1994); Chern. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504
u.s. 334, 335-37 (1992).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town ofCiarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,391-93 (1994).
Justice Kennedy did not participate in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 658-60
(1988), even though the case was argued and decided after he joined the Court. In
Morrison, a seven-member majority upheld the federal statute authorizing
appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate and, when appropriate,
prosecute the President and certain high-ranking government officials for violations of
federal criminal laws. 487 U.S. at 660.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 (1997).
See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417,438-40 (1998).
/d. at 449.
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standing in environmental law cases, 82 but he regularly added or
joined concurring opinions 83 that declined to restrict standing as much
as other Justices wanted, particularly Justice Scalia. 84 In 2000,
Justice Kennedy joined a seven-member majority in a decision
holding that Congress could grant standing to users of a river to
enforce permit limits under the Clean Water Act, 85 although he again
added a concurring opinion. 86
Justice Kennedy has also adopted an influential centrist position in
decisions regarding the power of the judiciary to review the detention
and trial of alleged enemy combatants. He and Justice O'Connor
both joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in ruling
that federal courts have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus
petitions from alleged enemy combatants detained by the military at
the United States naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 87 However,
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment because he thought
that Justice Steven's majority opinion failed to balance the relevant
separation of powers concerns. 88 In a second case, Justice Kennedy
joined Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion construing the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to require that a United
82.

83.

84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

See generally, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 105-10 (1998)
(holding that the respondents lacked standing because the relief sought would not
remedy the alleged injury in fact); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), 504 U.S.
555, 562-71 (1992) (holding that the respondents had not made the requisite
demonstration of injury and redressability to have standing); Lujan v. Nat' I Wildlife
Fed'n (Lujan I), 497 U.S. 871, 898-99 (1990) (holding that the respondent failed to
identify any '"agency action' that was the source of [the] injuries").
See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring joined by Kennedy, J.);
Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see generally Michael C. Blumm and Sherry L. Bosse, Justice Kennedy
and the Environment: Property, States' Rights, and a Persistent Search for Nexus, 82
WASH. L. REV. 667, 669-73 (2007) (discussing Justice Kennedy's pivotal role in the
environmental field, but also recognizing that he has only written twenty-one opinions
in more than three decades that are within the broad definition of environmental law,
including twelve majority opinions, eight concurring opinions, and one dissent).
See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine ofStanding as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881-84, 887-90 (1983)
(discussing how the ')udicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element
of [separation of powers]" and failure to restrict standing in environmental cases
allows '"all who breathe [the country's] air"' to sue, whereas the courts should give
more weight to the "traditional requirement that the plaintiff's alleged injury be a
particularized one") (second alteration in original).
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83
(2000).
!d. at 197 (Kennedy, J ., concurring).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 468, 485 (2004).
/d. at 485-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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States cttlzen being held as an "enemy combatant be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention
before a neutral decisionmaker."89 On the other hand, he along with
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s opinion requiring an alleged enemy combatant to file his
habeas corpus petition in the district where he was incarcerated. 90
Most fundamentally, Justice Kennedy has consistently supported
the expansion of the judicial role in constitutional law. This
expansion has proceeded in two ways. Most obviously, the domain
of constitutional law has expanded. Siding with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, Justice
Kennedy supported the reinvigoration of federalism limits on
congressional power91 and constitutional protections for property. 92
He also supported strict scrutiny for race-based programs of
affirmative action93 and the appropriateness of the Court resolving the
disputed presidential election of 2000. 94 At the same time, he joined
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and sometimes
Justice O'Connor, to allow standing in some environmental cases, 95
to provide broader protection under the Equal Protection Clause for
women and homosexuals, 96 to expand some substantive due process
claims, 97 and to invalidate some death penalty statutes. 98 The result
has been an increase in both the number and complexity of
constitutional doctrines. In addition, Justice Kennedy has vigorously
supported the principle that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution is final. Thus, he concurred in decisions that resisted
congressional attempts to overrule or circumvent Supreme Court
decisions involving the Commerce Clause, 99 the protections afforded
criminal defendants, 100 and the guarantee of the free exercise of
religion. 101
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442-43 (2004).
See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 105, 147-50 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying note 110.
See infra text accompanying note 111.
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 126, 140-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 124-28, 140-41 and accompanying text.
See irifra notes 163--66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,614-18 (2000).
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,431-32 (2000).
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511-18, 532-36 (1997) (Kennedy,
J., authored the majority opinion). Following the Supreme Court decision in City of
Boerne, Congress enacted a new statute that focused on state and local decisions
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C. Protection ofIndividual Rights
Justice Kennedy's positions regarding rights claims of individuals
are more difficult to characterize. In a number of important cases, the
Court divided along the lines that predominate in federalism and
separation of powers cases. 102 However, in other cases involving
individual rights, the Court's division crossed its normal ideological
lines. 103 In both groups of cases, Justice Kennedy often provided a
pivotal vote, and he frequently articulated a position that qualified the
position of the majority he joined.
The Court's normal ideological division dominated abortion and
equal protection cases 104 as well as the decisions reinvigorating the
protections of the Takings Clause. 105 As Justice Kennedy promised
in his confirmation hearing, 106 he has embraced the idea that due

I 02.
103.
104.

105.

106.

affecting religious organizations and decisions regarding individuals who have been
institutionalized. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2006).
See supra Part l.A-B.
See infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam
opinion by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, and Ginsberg, JJ.); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900 (1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ.); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J. and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined in part by Stevens
and Blackmun, JJ.) (finding that a statute requiring spousal notice of abortion violated
the Due Process Clause).
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (Kennedy, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., and joined in part by Stevens,
J.); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, O'Connor, and
Thomas, JJ.) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Nomination of Anthony M Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong.
85-86, 164-65, 179-80, reprinted in 15 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
359--61, 438-39, 453-54 (Roy M. Mersky & Gary R. Hartman, eds., WilliamS. Hein
& Co., 1991 ), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congresssenate/judiciary/sh 100
-1037/browse.html. I am grateful to Professor Lori Ringhand of the University of
Georgia Law School for this reference. She used it in a presentation at the 2007
meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools and later provided me with
the specific page references. The context of these comments makes them particularly
noteworthy. The Senate-with the Democrats again in majority after the 1986
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process protects substantive rights beyond those enumerated in the
Constitution. 107 He also recognized the woman's right to choose an
abortion as one of those rights, although he joined opinions
constricting the scope of that particular right. 108 Likewise, he broadly
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to provide expanded
constitutional protection for women and homosexuals, 109 strict
scrutiny for programs designed to aid racial and ethnic minorities, 110
and Supreme Court review of state recount procedures in presidential
elections. 111 In addition, he was a member of the majority in the one
case in which the Court revived the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. 112 When interpreting the Takings Clause, Justice Kennedy
has steered a middle course, joining opinions finding some
regulations to be takings, while allowing the government to condemn
property for economic development and to establish a temporary
moratorium on development. 113 With respect to the rights of criminal
defendants, Justice Kennedy generally sided with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, except in
death penalty cases where he authored several important opinions
finding the death penalty unconstitutional in specific
circumstances. 114 In free speech cases, he voted to invalidate both

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

112.

113.
114.

congressional elections-confirmed Justice Kennedy after defeating the nomination of
Robert Bork, who explicitly rejected the idea ofunenumerated rights.
See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 126, 140--41 and accompanying text.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-88 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,223-27 (1995).
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109-10 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that Florida's
recount procedures in the 2000 election were unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause, thus halting the recount).
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 491 (1999). The dissent notes that the Court has only
relied on the Privileges or Immunities Clause in other decisions that were later
overruled. !d. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554, 578-79 (2005) (holding it
unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on offenders who are under age eighteen
at the time of the crime).
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state 115 and federal 116 flag-burning statutes, but he has favored
restricting protections available to public employees. 117
Perhaps the most dramatic decision of the Rehnquist Court era was
the 1992 case 118 in which a majority of the Supreme Court refused to
overturn Roe v. Wade. 119 Justice Kennedy joined Justices O'Connor
and Souter as authors of the joint plurality opinion; they combined
with Justices Blackmun and Stevens to reaffirm Roe's "essential
holding," which recognized a woman's right to choose an abortion as
constitutionally protected. 120 Even as the Justices who authored the
plurality reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe, they demonstrated
that the Court would be considerably more willing to allow
regulations of abortions so long as the regulations did not place an
"undue burden" on the woman's right. 121 Indeed, the Court sustained
all but one of the regulations before it in the 1992 case. 122
Eventually, however, Justice Kennedy split with Justices O'Connor
and Souter over the scope of the state's power to regulate abortions.
In 2000, Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas all dissented from a decision holding that a state
ban on dilation and extraction abortions placed an undue burden on
the woman's right to choose. 123
Justice Kennedy also has been willing to use the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth Amendmene 24 and the Fourteenth Amendmene 25
to protect other individual rights not specifically enumerated in the
115. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398, 415-20 (1989) (holding that Texas could not
criminalize flag burning, as it is a form of protected expression).
116. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 311-12 (1990) (striking down the Flag
Protection Act of 1989).
117. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 686 (1994) (Kennedy, J., joining concurring
opinion of Scalia, J.) (criticizing the Court for granting the right of an investigation to
a public employee before a speech-related dismissal).
118. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (reaffirming the essential holding of Roe v. Wade).
119. 410U.S.ll3 (1973).
120. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 843, 846.
121. /d. at 876-77.
122. Id. at 879. The Court upheld the statutory definition of emergency, the informed
consent requirements, the twenty-four hour waiting period, the parental consent
provision, and the reporting and record-keeping requirements. /d. at 879-80, 883,
887, 899-901. The only provision that the plurality found imposed an undue burden
on women seeking abortions was the spousal notification provision. /d. at 894-95.
123. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 919, 945-46 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process oflaw .... ").
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process oflaw ....").
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Constitution. He authored the opinion holding that the right of sexual
intimacy extended to homosexuals, 126 and he consistently joined the
majority that has limited the amount that injured parties can collect in
punitive damages. 127 Justice Kennedy also provided the crucial vote
to invalidate a statute imposing pension liability for former
employees of coal companies, even though he was the only Justice
who relied on substantive due process as the basis for the decision. 128
In cases involving equal protection claims, Justice Kennedy has
generally been a member of the majority, although the makeup of the
majority has varied. 129 In most cases where the Court was narrowly
divided, Justice Kennedy formed a majority with the more
conservative members of the Court. 130 In a few cases, however, he
joined the more liberal members ofthe Court. 131
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor generally sided with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to form a majority with
respect to equal protection issues. That majority stopped Florida's
attempt to recount ballots in the 2000 presidential election, 132 as well
as invalidated racially based voting districts 133 and affirmative action
programs. 134 In the last two groups of cases, Justice Kennedy joined
Justice O'Connor in refusing to forbid all uses of race, 135 but he was

126. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003).
127. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 412, 429 (2003); BMW
ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,561,585-86 (1996).
128. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538-39 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court's reliance on the Takings
Clause was unnecessary).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 518-19 (1996) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause precludes Virginia from reserving the unique educational
opportunities offered by Virginia Military Institute exclusively for men); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 900 (1996) (holding that the North Carolina voter redistricting
plan violated the Equal Protection Clause) (emphasis omitted).
130. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 247 (2003); Shaw, 517 U.S. at 900; see
supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (categorizing the conservative Justices as
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ali to).
131. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996); see supra notes 26-27 and
accompanying text (categorizing the more liberal Justices as Justice Stevens, Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer).
132. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100, 109-10, 135 (2000) (per curiam decision where
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer dissented).
133. See, e.g., Shaw, 517 U.S. at 900, 902; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 902,917-20
(1995).
134. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 247, 275 (2003).
135. But see Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1985) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (accepting that "[t]he moral
imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause").
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less willing to find race-based programs constitutional. 136 These
different views surfaced most clearly in the case challenging the
affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law
School. 137 Justice O'Connor accepted the use of race as one of a
number of factors in selecting applicants. 138 Justice Kennedy argued
that the law school program was unconstitutional because it placed
too much reliance on race in the admissions process. 139
In the October 1995 Term, both Justice Kennedy and Justice
O'Connor joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in
decisions expanding protections for women and homosexuals.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the majority in a case that
provided enhanced protections against gender discrimination without
explicitly making it a suspect classification. 140 Justice Kennedy
himself authored the opinion that invalidated a state constitutional
amendment because it reflected "animus" toward homosexuals. 141
When the Court resurrected the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendmene 42 in 1999, Justice Kennedy was a
member of the seven-Justice majority. 143 He joined Justice Stevens's
opinion that upheld the right of recent arrivals in a state to receive the
same state welfare payments as other citizens of that state. 144
Justice Kennedy has also been a pivotal vote in defining the extent
to which the Takings Clause limits governmental control of real
property. He occasionally joined a majority holding that government
regulations can constitute a taking for which compensation is

136. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387, 389, 392-93 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 996, 999 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(joining in the plurality opinion that rejected the argument that all use of race to assign
political districts was unconstitutional, an argument that Justice Thomas advanced in
his opinion concurring in the judgment).
137. Grutter, 539 U.S. at311.
138. See id. at 337.
139. !d. at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the law school failed to show that
race did not become a prominent factor in the admissions process and thus did not
satisfy the strict scrutiny standard).
140. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-35 (1996) (proscribing a heightened
review standard of an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for government based
action, even though gender was not made a suspect classification).
141. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (explaining how the state amendment
was unconstitutional because it targeted a single named group and lacked a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... ").
143. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 491 (1999).
144. !d. at 502-04 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1973)).
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required. 145 On the other hand, he has been tolerant of temporary
controls on development, and he has broadly defined the
government's authority to condemn property. 146
Both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor (along with Justice White)
were part of a six-member majority that held that a state coastal
regulation was a taking if it denied an owner compensation of all
economically viable uses of his property. 147 Justice Kennedy,
however, qualified his support of that holding in a concurring
opinion. 148 Subsequently, Justice Kennedy joined an opinion holding
that a land use permit condition was a taking if it was not roughly
proportional to the burden imposed by the permitted land use. 149 He
also authored a 2001 opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, holding that a property
owner could raise a takings claim to a regulation established prior to
the owner's acquisition of the property. 150 In addition, Justice
Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote to invalidate a regulation
imposing pension obligations on a company that formerly had coal
mining operations; 151 however, as noted above, 152 he relied on the
Due Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause.
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy joined Justices O'Connor,
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in rejecting a claim that a
temporary moratorium on development around Lake Tahoe was a
taking. 153 Furthermore, in a controversial 2005 opinion holding that
the Takings Clause did not preclude a local government from
condemning land for an economic development project, 154 Justice
Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote and wrote a concurring
opinion. 155
145. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1035-36 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment) (reversing the judgment of the state supreme court that
denied compensation to the property owner, noting the relevance of the owner's
reasonable expectation and the regulation's effect on the value of the land).
146. See infra notes 153-55.
147. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-22, 1031-32.
148. /d. at 1032, 1035-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
149. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1994) (citing Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)).
150. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 610, 632 (2001).
151. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
152. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
153. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 30506, 320 (2002).
154. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
155. See id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Justice Kennedy joined Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in the majority vote).
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In criminal cases, both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor
usually sided with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas to support the narrow definition of the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants, 156 although Justice O'Connor seems to have
been more willing to break that pattern. 157 Insofar as Justice Kennedy
is concerned, one can identify at least two important exceptions to the
pattern. First, Justice Kennedy has been part of the group that has
tried to limit the reach of an ideologically diverse majority's broad
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal
cases. 158 Second, Justice Kennedy has sided with Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and sometimes Justice O'Connor, to
invalidate the death sentence in several important capital punishment
cases. 159
Justice Kennedy has not generally supported the Court's expansion
of the right to a jury trial for issues relating to the enhancement of
criminal sentences. In the first two cases expanding the right, he
dissented, 160 but he was part of the majority that applied those
decisions to capital defendants. 161 Subsequently, he provided the
crucial fifth vote for Justice Breyer's majority opinion granting
advisory status to the federal sentencing guidelines. 162
Justice Kennedy's most significant influence in criminal law cases
has undoubtedly come in death penalty cases. Although he and
Justice O'Connor sided with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas to uphold death sentences in a number of cases, 163
156. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65, 67 (2003); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 178, 185-86 (1990).
157. See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 608-09 (2003) (finding invalid a
California law that allowed prosecution of certain crimes beyond the previous statute
of limitations for those crimes); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 656, 658 (2002)
(holding that a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel even in a case where
the state seeks only a suspended sentence followed by probation); Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322-23 (2001) (Justice O'Connor did not join the opinion
holding that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests for minor criminal
offenses).
158. See infra notes 16~2 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
160. Blakley v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 297, 313-14 (2004) (holding that a sentencing
enhancer based on a finding of deliberate cruelty was an issue that should have been
decided by a jury); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that any
fact that would increase the punishment beyond the statutory maximum must be
examined by a jury, with the exception of prior convictions).
161. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 587-89 (2002).
162. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225, 245 (2005).
163. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 375, 379 (1999); Romano v.
Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1994); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 372 (1990);
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he has sometimes been a swing Justice in capital punishment cases.
Justice Kennedy (and Justice O'Connor) occasionally joined Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in setting aside the death
penalty on procedural grounds, 164 and in finding the death penalty
unconstitutional for the mentally retarded. 165 He also authored an
opinion finding the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles over
the age of fifteen. 166
Justices often divide differently from their usual ideological
groupings in First Amendment cases, and Justice Kennedy's opinions
in the vast doctrinal area of free speech claims defy easy
characterization. 167 In several important areas, he supported the
expansion of First Amendment claims. Perhaps most importantly, he
has vigorously opposed limits on campaign contributions and
spending, 168 and he has dissented from decisions upholding
restrictions on speech-related conduct of abortion protestors. 169 He
also supported the decisions requiring public institutions to grant
equal access to religious groups, 170 and he was part of the majorities
invalidating both state and federal statutes making it a crime to burn
the United States flag. 171 At the same time, he concurred with a
majority narrowly construing the rights of public employees to

164.

165.
166.

167.

168.

169.
170.
171.

see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1993) (Justice Kennedy-but not
Justice O'Connor-joining majority opinion holding that an instruction regarding
future dangerousness allowed adequate consideration of defendant's youth).
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 289 (2004) (holding that the Fifth Circuit's
'"uniquely severe permanent handicap'" and '"nexus'" tests as they relate to low IQ
are debatably incorrect, thus allowing petitioner to pursue habeas relief); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (granting habeas relief for ineffective assistance of
counsel based on a reasonable probability that sentence would have been different
with effective counsel).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment restricts a state's power to execute the mentally retarded).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554, 578-79 (2005) (forbidding the death penalty
for juveniles). Although Justice O'Connor joined the majority in Atkins, she dissented
in Roper. /d. at 587-607 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For a recent attempt at a general explanation of Justice Kennedy's opinions, see Helen
J. Knowles, The Supreme Court as Civic Educator: Free Speech According to Justice
Kennedy, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 252, 252 (2008) (characterizing Justice Kennedy as
a "free speech libertarian").
See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 286-88 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,405 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 765 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Good News Club v. Millford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 101, 120 (2001);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 822, 845-46 (1995).
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,311,318 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397,420 (1989).
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protest policies to which they object, 172 and he wrote the opinion of
the Court concluding that substantial truth rather than literal accuracy
is the test for quotations in defamation actions. 173 In pornography
cases, Justice Kennedy has again adopted a centrist position. He
joined in the opinion allowing the government to criminalize
possession of child pornography, 174 but authored an opinion that
invalidated the federal statute extending that authority to pornography
which used adult actors who appeared to be children. 175
Justice Kennedy has also carved out a distinctive position in cases
regarding freedom of religion. 176 In Establishment Clause cases, he
authored the opinion prohibiting an invocation at a secondary school
graduation because of its coercive effect, 177 and he joined the
majority that invalidated the use of invocations at high school
football games. 178 At the same time, he has been willing to grant
governments considerable discretion to display religious symbols. 179
In cases raising Free Exercise Clause claims, Justice Kennedy has
been a consistent member of the majority. He concurred silently in a
case rejecting strict scrutiny for laws of general applicability even
when they imposed a burden on religious practices, 180 as well as in a
case upholding a state decision to exclude theology students from a
state scholarship program. 181 In addition, he authored the opinion of
the Court holding that a local ordinance restricting the animal
sacrifices of the Santeria religion violated the Free Exercise Clause. 182
II.

DECISIONS SINCE 2005

The decisions of the Supreme Court's first four Terms since John
Roberts became Chief Justice confirm Justice Kennedy's crucial
172. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 686 (1994) (Kennedy, J., joining concurring
opinion of Scalia, J.).
173. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 498, 517 (1991).
174. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 106, Ill (1990).
175. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239, 257-58 (2002).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....").
177. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,599 (1992).
178. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
179. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Kennedy, J., joining plurality
opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885
(2005) (Kennedy, J., joining in part the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia);
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
180. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873 (1990).
181. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
182. Church of the Lukurni Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1993).
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impact on a closely divided Court. They continue the basic trend of
the last three decades, a gradual but consistent move to the right. At
the same time, they demonstrate the considerable extent to which the
views of Justice Kennedy define how far that trend extends and
create some important exceptions to it.

A.

2005 Term

The 2005 Term was a transitional one. Although Chief Justice
Roberts was confirmed before the Term began, Justice Alito did not
take his seat until January 31, 2006. 183 Justice O'Connor continued to
serve until Justice Alito was confirmed, so the Court's previous
ideological division continued for about thirty percent of the
decisions of the Term. Partially because of the transition, five-to-four
divisions were relatively uncommon as compared to the last years of
the Rehnquist Court. 184 Nonetheless, the decisions rendered after
Justice Alito joined the Court began to show the increased
importance of Justice Kennedy when the Court was closely divided.
Justice O'Connor was part of the Court for the first twenty-six
opinions the Supreme Court issued during the 2005 Term, and her
presence tended to hide Justice Kennedy's new influence on the
Court. In the cases in which Justice O'Connor was part of the Court,
she and Justice Kennedy continued to share the center when the
Court was narrowly divided. Both joined Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Thomas to form a five-member majority
upholding a death penalty verdict even though the state appellate
court set aside two of the "special circumstances" found by the
jury. 185 Likewise, they both joined with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in rejecting the power of the United States
Attorney General to forbid physicians from prescribing drugs covered
by the federal Controlled Substances Act for use in physician-assisted
suicides authorized by state law. 186 On the other hand, Justice
O'Connor broke with Justice Kennedy to join Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that the state was not
immune from liability in a proceeding initiated by a bankruptcy

183. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 5.
184. Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 2005,75 U.S.L.W. 3029,3029 (July
18, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 Term Statistics]. See generally Lori A. Ringhand, The
Roberts Court: Year 1, 73 TENN. L. REv. 607 (2006) (providing a detailed comparison
of the Roberts Court and the Rehnquist Court).
185. Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212,213-15 (2006).
186. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 247 (2006).
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trustee to set aside preferential transfers by the debtor to state
agencies. 187
Other factors in the 2005 Term also tended to mask Justice
Kennedy's increasing influence on the Court. Under Chief Justice
Roberts, the Court produced more unanimous decisions than had
been typical in the last years of the Rehnquist Court. 188 In a few
cases, Justice Breyer joined the new Chief Justice and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito to produce six-member majorities. 189 In
one important case, Chief Justice Roberts broke with his normal
ideological allies and sided with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer to set aside a property forfeiture because the state
procedures did not require sufficient efforts to provide actual notice
to the property owner. 190 Moreover, Justice Kennedy dissented nine
times during the Term, 191 more than either of the two new Justices
and the same number of times as Justice Scalia. 192
Nonetheless, careful examination of the cases from the 2005 Term
reveals Justice Kennedy's increasingly important role as the pivotal
Justice. He sided with the majority in nine of the thirteen decisions 193

187. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006).
188. See 2005 Term Statistics, supra note 184, at 3029.
189. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521
(2006) (six-member majority with Alito not participating). Justice Kennedy
concurred only in the judgment in Randall v. Sorrell. As he had done in the past, he
argued for greater First Amendment protection for campaign contributions. Randall,
548 U.S. at 264 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
190. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 222 (2006). The dissenting Justices complained that
Jones took a stricter view of notice requirements than the Court had adopted in
Dusenbury v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002). See Jones, 547 U.S. at 243-44.
191. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 781 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v.
Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting opinion of
Alita, J.); Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 875 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Howard Delivery Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 668
(2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh,
547 U.S. 677, 702 (2006) (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting opinion of Breyer, J.);
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 239 (2006) (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting opinion
of Thomas, J.); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Edkrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407
(2006) (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting opinion of Stevens, J.); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coil.
v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,379 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,joining dissenting opinion of Thomas,
J.); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 116 (2005) (Kennedy,
J.,joining dissenting opinion of Ginsburg, J.).
192. See 2005 Term Statistics, supra note 184, at 3030. It should be noted that Justice
Alita only participated in thirty-nine of the court's decisions. /d.
193. !d. at 3029.
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in which the Court divided five to four or five to three. 194 As
expected, he most often sided with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, 195 but he joined Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer three times 196 and an ideologically mixed
majority once. 197 Although Justice Kennedy dissented in four cases
in which the Court had a five-member majority, 198 the decisions did
not reflect any general shift in the ideological makeup of the Court. 199
Only one of the cases was an important constitutional case, and it
194. Omitted from the list of five-three majorities is Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam). Although the Court
divided five to three with Chief Justice Roberts not participating, this Article omits the
case because the Supreme Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted rather
than considering the case on the merits. /d. at 124. Justice Kennedy was part of the
five-member majority with Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
195. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163 (2006); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Brown v.
Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006). Justice O'Connor was part of the five-member
majority in the Brown case. 546 U.S. at 213. As noted below, Justice Kennedy sided
with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on the broad
challenge to the Texas reapportionment in Perry, but joined Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in finding that one district violated the Voting Rights Act. See
infra note 218 and accompanying text.
196. Hamdan v. Rumsfe1d, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006);
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). All three of these decisions had five to
three divisions; Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in Hamdan, and Justice Alito
did not participate in House or Randolph.
197. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198,200 (2006).
198. United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (Kennedy, J., Roberts,
C.J., and Thomas J., joining dissenting opinion of Alito, J.); Empire Healthchoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 702 (2006) (Kennedy, Souter, and Alito,
JJ., joining dissenting opinion of Breyer, J.); Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 239
(2006) (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting opinion of Thomas, J.); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli.
v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting opinion of Thomas,
J.). This Article does not count Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), as a fivemember majority case, although it is admittedly a difficult case to classify. Joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, Justice Souter's majority
opinion held that Arizona's rules regarding the insanity defense did not violate the
Due Process Clause. /d. at 779. Justice Breyer concurred in that holding (creating a
six-member majority on that issue), but he dissented from the Court's failure to
remand the case to the state court to clarify whether the state court proceedings had
been conducted in accordance with the Court's opinion. /d. at 781 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy wrote an
opinion dissenting to the majority's constitutional holding. Id.
199. See GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR. SUPREME COURT INST., SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2005 OVERVIEW 9-10 (2006), available at http://
www.1aw.georgetown.edu/sci/documents/gulcsupctinstitutefinalreport2005 _30june06
_OOI.pdf.
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occurred before Justice O'Connor left the Court. 200 In that decision,
Justice O'Connor again joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer to create another exception to the prohibition against
congressional creation of private actions for damages against the
state, 201 this time allowing Congress to subordinate a state entity to
other creditors in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. 202
Justice Kennedy wrote the crucial opinion in four of the six cases in
which he formed a five-member majority with the Chief Justice,
Justices Scalia and Thomas, and either Justice O'Connor or Justice
Alito. He wrote two majority opinions 203 and two concurring
opinions that significantly qualified the position of the other Justices
in the majority. 204
Three of the cases were criminal prosecutions. 205 Two involved the
death penalty. 206 In one, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's
opinion upholding a death sentence even though the state appellate
court set aside two of the "special circumstances" on which the jury
based its sentencing recommendation. 207 In the other, he joined
Justice Thomas's opinion that rejected a challenge to the Kansas
capital statute, which required the death penalty if the aggravating
circumstances of the crime were not outweighed by the mitigating
circumstances. 208 The third criminal justice decision declined to
exclude evidence from all searches in which the police violated the
"knock and announce" procedures for executing warrants. 209 In this
case, however, Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment. 210
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for a five-member majority in a
case restricting the First Amendment rights of public employees. 211

200. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coil. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
20 l. I d.
202. Id. at 364.
203. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
204. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
205. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006); Hudson, 547 U.S. 586; Brown v. Sanders, 546
u.s. 212 (2006).
206. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163; Brown, 546 U.S. 212.
207. Brown, 546 U.S. at 212. Justice O'Connor was part of the five-member majority in
this case. /d. at 213.
208. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 170-71.
209. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 586.
210. /d. at 602 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
211. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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That opinion concluded that an employee has no First Amendment
protection for speech made as part of his or her official duties. 212
Finally, Justice Kennedy sided with the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in two important cases involving issues of
statutory construction, but he articulated a unique position in both
cases. 213 Although he agreed to a remand to determine whether a
wetland fell within the coverage of the Clean Water Act/ 14 his
concurring opinion215 articulated a materially different test for
determining the extent of the "waters of the United States" than the
one suggested in Justice Scalia's plurality opinion. 216 In a challenge
to a reapportionment of the Texas legislature, Justice Kennedy wrote
the opinion of the Court. 217 He sided with Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito with respect to the challenge to the
entire redistricting statute, but he joined the other four Justices to
form a five-member majority finding that the creation of one district
violated the Voting Rights Act. 218
Justice Kennedy joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer to form five-member majorities in three cases. As noted
above, Justice Kennedy also authored an important administrative
law opinion that was joined by Justice O'Connor as well as Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 219 That decision denied the
Attorney General the power to forbid the dispensing of drugs covered
by the Controlled Substances Act. 220
Two of these decisions in which Justice Kennedy sided with
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to form a fivemember majority involved criminal law issues. In the first, Justice
Kennedy joined Justice Souter's opinion refusing to allow a spouse to
consent to a search of the marital residence when the defendant was

212. /d.at410.
213. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 602 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
214. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally Robin Kundis
Craig, Justice Kennedy and Ecosystem Services: A Functional Approach to Clean
Water Act Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 38 ENVTL. L. 605 (2008); Brandee Ketchum,
Note, Like the Swamp Thing: Something Ambiguous Rises from the Hidden Depths of
Murky Waters-The Supreme Court's Treatment of Murky Wet Land in Rapanos v.
United States, 68 LA. L. REv. 983 (2008).
215. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759.
216. /d. at 739 (plurality opinion).
217. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 408 (2006).
218. See id. at 408,423-25,442-43,446-47.
219. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
220. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 247, 274-75 (2006).
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present and expressly refused to consent. 221 In the other, Justice
Kennedy wrote the majority opinion allowing a habeas corpus claim
based on the alleged innocence of the petitioner. 222
The fmal case of the 2005 Term in which Justice Kennedy joined
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concerned the
procedures for trying detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and was
one of the most controversial decisions of the Term. 223 The majority
ruled that the President had no inherent authority to create military
commissions to try alleged enemy combatants being detained at
Guantanamo Bay. 224 Justice Kennedy, however, wrote a separate
opinion concurring in part. 225
Justice Kennedy also joined a five-member majority that formed
along less predictable lines in a case involving a relatively narrow
issue. 226 Along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Souter and
Alito, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion upholding
the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition as untimely. 227

B.

2006 Term

If anyone had lingering doubts, the October 2006 Term confirmed
that Justice Kennedy is now the decisional fulcrum of the Supreme
Court. He was almost always part of the majority, and each time the
Court divided five to four, he was one of the five. 228 Moreover, his
opinion was crucial in defining the parameters of rulings when the
Court was closely divided because he was the member of the
majority most likely to form a new majority with the dissenters.
During the October 2006 Term, Justice Kennedy dissented in only
two cases, and he wrote only one dissenting opinion. 229 That record
made him a member of the majority in more than ninety-seven
221. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 105-06 (2006). This decision had a five to three
majority because Justice Ali to did not participate in the decision. /d.
222. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 520-22 (2006). This decision had a five to three
majority because Justice Ali to did not participate in the decision. /d.
223. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 564, 636 (2006).
224. !d. at 564, 590--95. This decision had a five to three majority because Chief Justice
Roberts did not participate in the decision. /d. at 564.
225. !d. at 636.
226. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 200 (2006).
227. /d. at 202 (Kennedy, J., Roberts, C.J., and Souter and Alito, JJ., joining majority
opinion of Justice Ginsburg).
228. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russel, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S.
286 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
229. United Hauler's Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 332 (2007) (Kennedy, J., joining in dissent by Justice Alito); Cunningham v.
California, 549 U.S. 270, 295 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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percent of the sixty-eight cases that the Court decided by signed
opinion after argument. 230 The other Justices dissented in eight to
twenty-six cases. 231
In twenty-four cases, the Court had a five-member majority, and
Justice Kennedy was part of the majority in each of the cases. 232 As
in the 2005 Term, he sided most frequently with Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 233 However, he
joined Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer in twenty-five
percent of the closely divided cases. 234 Perhaps most interestingly,
the Court decided five cases with a five-member majority that
crossed the Court's normal ideological divisions. 235 Although those
cases produced four different majorities, Justice Kennedy was one of
the five in each ofthem. 236
The nine decisions of the 2006 Term involving capital punishment
and standing issues provided the strongest confirmation of Justice
Kennedy's new influence. In the cases in both areas, the remainder
of the Court consistently broke into its typical ideological

230.

231.

232.
233.

234.

235.

236.

Statistics for the Supreme Court's October 2006 Term, 76 U.S.L.W. 3052, 3053 (Aug.
8, 2007) [hereinafter 2006 Term Statistics]. In one of these cases, Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007), the Court divided five to three because
Justice Thomas did not participate.
Chief Justice Roberts dissented in eight cases, Justice Alito in ten, Justice Scalia in
fourteen, Justices Souter and Thomas in sixteen, Justice Breyer in seventeen, Justice
Ginsburg in twenty, and Justice Stevens in twenty-six. 2006 Term Statistics, supra
note 230, at 3053.
Id.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007);
Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Morse v. Frederick, 55 I
U.S. 393 (2007); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007);
National Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007);
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. I (2007);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Lawrence
v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007); Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006).
See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286
(2007); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S.
233 (2007); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Marrama v. Citizens Bank
of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007).
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Watters, 550 U.S. I (five to three
decision, Justice Thomas not participating); Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483
(2007); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); Osborn v. Haley, 549
U.S. 225 (2007).
James, 550 U.S. 192; Watters, 550 U.S. I (five to three decision, Justice Thomas not
participating); Limtiaco, 549 U.S. 483; Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. 346; Osborn, 549
U.S. 225.
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groupings. 237 Justice Kennedy adopted middle positions that decided
with one group in five cases and the other in four. 238
Seven of the twenty-four cases with a five-member majority
involved challenges to the imposition of capital punishment. 239 Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito voted to reject
the challenges in all seven cases, and Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer voted to set aside the sentences in all seven
cases. 240 Justice Kennedy voted to affirm the death sentences in three
cases 241 and to reverse them in four. 242 Moreover, he authored four of
the seven opinions in the capital punishment cases, rejecting
challenges to the death penalty in two, 243 and ruling in favor of the
challenges in two. 244
Each of the three capital punishment decisions in which Justice
Kennedy sided with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, involved a case in which the Ninth Circuit had
reversed a district court decision and granted habeas corpus relief to a
defendant who had been sentenced to death. 245 Justice Kennedy
authored the majority opinion in the first and third of these
decisions. 246 In the first, Justice Kennedy's opinion upheld a jury
instruction on mitigation. 247 The instruction directed the jury to
consider '" [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of
the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. "'248 That
language was sufficient, he concluded, to inform the jury that it
should consider evidence that the defendant would live a constructive
life if incarcerated because of the religious conversion he had
experienced during a previous incarceration. 249 In the third of the
237. See Panetti, 551 U.S. 930; Hein, 551 U.S. 587; Uttecht, 551 U.S. I; Schriro, 550 U.S.
465; Smith, 550 U.S. 297; Brewer, 550 U.S. 286; Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. 233;
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497; Ayers, 549 U.S. 7.
238. Panetti, 551 U.S. 930; Uttecht, 551 U.S. I; Schriro, 550 U.S. 465; Smith, 550 U.S.
297; Brewer, 550 U.S. 286; Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. 233; Ayers, 549 U.S. 7.
239. Panetti, 551 U.S. 930; Uttecht, 551 U.S. I; Schriro, 550 U.S. 465; Smith, 550 U.S.
297; Brewer, 550 U.S. 286; Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. 233; Ayers, 549 U.S. 7.
240. Panetti, 551 U.S. 930; Uttecht, 551 U.S. I; Schriro, 550 U.S. 465; Smith, 550 U.S.
297; Brewer, 550 U.S. 286; Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. 233; Ayers, 549 U.S. 7.
241. Uttecht, 551 U.S. I; Schriro, 550 U.S. 465; Ayers, 549 U.S. 7.
242. Panetti, 551 U.S. 930; Smith, 550 U.S. 297; Brewer, 550 U.S. 286; Abdul-Kabir, 550
U.S. 233.
243. Uttecht, 551 U.S. I; Ayers, 549 U.S. 7.
244. Panetti, 551 U.S. 930; Smith, 550 U.S. 297.
245. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 4-5; Schriro, 550 U.S. at 472; Ayers, 549 U.S. at 9-11.
246. Uttecht, 551 U.S. I; Ayers, 549 U.S. 7.
247. Ayers, 549 U.S. at 9-11.
248. /d. at I 0 (alterations in original).
249. !d. at 18.
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Ninth Circuit cases, Justice Kennedy concluded that the court of
appeals should have deferred to the trial court's determination
regarding whether a prosecution challenge for cause should be
sustained. 250 Justice Thomas authored the remaining opinion in a
capital punishment case reversing the Ninth Circuit. 251 His opinion
rejected the claim that the district court's failure to investigate
mitigating evidence denied the defendant his right to effective
counsel in a case when the defendant directed his counsel not to
present any mitigating evidence. 252
The four cases in which Justice Kennedy joined with Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer to grant habeas relief all
involved death penalty cases from Texas. Two of the cases turned on
a Texas statute253 that required the death sentence if the defendant
engaged in conduct deliberately, with the reasonable expectation that
the conduct would result in his victim's death, and if it was probable
that the defendant would commit future violent acts constituting a
continuing threat to society. 254 In both cases, Justice Stevens
authored opinions finding a reasonable likelihood that the instructions
prevented jurors from giving meaningful consideration to
constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. 255 The first case
involved the testimony of family members describing the defendant's
unhappy childhood as well as expert testimony that explained the
defendant's violent propensities as attributable to neurological
damage and childhood neglect and abandonment. 256 In the second
case, the defendant introduced mitigating evidence of his mental
illness, his father's extensive abuse of him and his mother, and his
substance abuse. 257 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinions in the other
two cases in which he formed a majority that granted habeas relief in
capital punishment cases. 258 One of Justice Kennedy's opinions
concluded that a capital defendant was not required to show
egregious harm from the use of a jury instruction when the Supreme
Court determined that an instruction was constitutionally invalid after

250. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 9-10.
251. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
252. Jd. at475-76.
253. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(e)(1) (Vernon 2006), amended by
2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 87 (West).
254. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Brewer v. Quartermen, 550 U.S.
286 (2007).
255. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 237-38; Brewer, 550 U.S. at 288-89.
256. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 239-41.
257. Brewer, 550 U.S. at 289-90.
258. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007).
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the defendant's trial. 259 In the remaining case, Justice Kennedy
authored an opinion finding that the Fifth Circuit standard for mental
competency was overly restrictive. 260
The Court decided two standing cases in the 2006 Term, and
Justice Kennedy was the decisive vote to grant standing in one case
and to deny it in the other. 261 In April 2007, he joined Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in a ruling that allowed
Massachusetts to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency's
finding that carbon dioxide was not an air pollutant. 262 Two months
later, he sided with the dissenters from the Massachusetts case, in a
majority ruling that disallowed an organization of individuals
opposed to the endorsement of religion to challenge the creation of a
White House office to coordinate faith-based initiatives. 263 However,
in the second case, Justice Kennedy rejected Justice Scalia's opinion
arguing that a 1968 decision 264 allowing taxpayers standing to
challenge federal appropriations on the ground that they violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 265 should be
overruled. 266 His concurring opinion defended the earlier decision as
"correct. " 267
In thirteen of the twenty-four cases with a five-member majority,
Justice Kennedy sided with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Ali to. 268 As noted in the preceding paragraphs, four of

259.
260.

261.
262.

263.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Smith, 550 U.S. at 315-16.
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956. Justice Kennedy concluded that the standard was too
restrictive, because it ignored the possibility that delusions might put the defendant's
awareness of the connections between his crime and sentence in a context so far
removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose. Id at 957-59.
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497. See generally Andrew Long, Standing &
Consensus: Globalism in Massachusetts v. EPA, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73 (2008);
Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law's Growing
Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REv. 111 (2008).
Hein, 551 U.S. 587. For an argument that Hein suggests a changing substance of First
Amendment law, see Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the
Roberts Court and the Establishment Clause, 78 MISS. L.J. 199 (2008); Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.
and the Future ofEstablishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REv. 115 (2008).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ").
Hein, 551 U.S. at 618-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Flast
v. Cohen should be overruled).
ld. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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the thirteen involved capital punishment and standing issues. 269 The
remainder involved an assortment of constitutional questions, issues
relating to time limits to file suit or to appeal, 270 and problems of
statutory construction. 271
The decisions in which Justice Kennedy sided with Justices Scalia
and Thomas and the new members of the Court included four
important constitutional decisions, in addition to the capital
punishment and standing decisions. Justice Kennedy provided the
crucial vote to expand congressional control over a woman's right to
choose an abortion 272 and to limit congressional authority over
campaign finance. 273 At the same time, his vote expanded state
power to control speech by students in secondary schools274 and
restricted the ability of states to adopt race-based affirmative action
programs. 275
269. See supra notes 239--42, 261-63 and accompanying text.
270. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206 (2007); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329
(2007).
271. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007);
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders ofWildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007).
272. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132-33 (2007); see also Helen J. Knowles,
Clerkish Control of Recent Supreme Court Opinions?: A Case Study of Justice
Kennedy's Opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 63, 63 (2009)
(arguing that the paternalistic view of abortion manifested in Gonzales is likely the
product of a clerk's influence). See generally Reva Siegel, The Right's Reasons:
Constitutional Coriflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument,
57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (arguing the significance of the gender-based antiabortion
argument through its appearance in Gonzales v. Carhart); Ronald Turner, Gonzales v.
Carhart and the Court's "Women's Regret" Rationale, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(2008) (discussing the Court's attention to the emotional aspect of abortion).
273. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007). See
generally Michael Anthony Lawrence, Reading Tea Leaves in Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life: Hope for a Buckley Evolution?, 43 TuLSA L.
REv. 697 (2008) (analyzing the effect of Federal Election Commission on campaign
finance and its relation to the Buckley v. Valeo decision).
274. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007). See generally Symposium,
Schools After Morse v. Frederick, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1 (2008) (discussing the
effect of Morse).
275. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. l, 551 U.S. 701, 709-11
(2007). See generally Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential ofGrutter v. Bollinger:
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L.
REv. 937 (2008) (arguing that Parents Involved curtailed previous decisions
upholding affirmative action programs); Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice
Kennedy's Opinion in Parents Involved: Why Fifty Years of Experience Shows
Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REv. 735 (2008) (analyzing Justice Kennedy's opinion in
relation to race and public schools); Jonathan L. Entin, Parents Involved and the
Meaning of Brown: An Old Debate Renewed, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 923 (2008)
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Justice Kennedy carved distinctive positions in all four cases. He
authored opinions in two 276 and joined concurring opinions in the
other two. 277 He authored the opinion for the Court in the abortion
case, 278 which retreated from the 2000 decision that had invalidated a
similar state law. 279 Justice Kennedy concluded that the failure to
include an exception for preservation of the pregnant woman's health
did not impose an unconstitutional burden on the woman's right to
choose an abortion. 280 Although conceding that the statute would be
unconstitutional if it subjected women to significant health risks,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the conflicting medical evidence on
that issue was sufficient for the statute to survive a facial attack. 281 In
the affirmative-action case, Justice Kennedy joined Chief Justice
Roberts's majority opinion that the race-based programs before the
Court were unconstitutional, 282 but he authored a concurring opinion
indicating that race-based programs might be permissible in some
cases. 283 In the two First Amendment cases, Justice Kennedy joined
concurring opinions by other Justices. One was a campaign finance
case in which he joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, which

276.
277.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

(discussing the history of racial discrimination and the newest developments in the
Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution); Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School
Integration Cases and the Contextual Equal Protection Clause, 51 How. L.J. 251
(2008) (discussing Parents Involved, race, and the Equal Protection Clause); Heather
Gerken, Comment, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV.
L. REv. 104 (2007) (discussing Justice Kennedy's views on race and their relation to
the Court's opinions); Michelle Renee Shamblin, Note, Silencing Chicken Little:
Options for School Districts After Parents Involved, 69 LA. L. REv. 219 (2008)
(critiquing Parents Involved and proposing alternate options for schools in Louisiana);
Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Benign Race-Conscious Actions Are Necessary to End Race
Discrimination and Achieve Actual Equality, in V ALPARISO UNIVERSITY LEGAL
STUDIES RESEARCH REPORT No. 08-11 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1284461 (arguing that race-based programs can pass Supreme Court standards of
review); Nelson Lund, Justice Kennedy's Stricter Scrutiny and the Future of Racial
Diversity Promotion, 9 ENGAGE 20 (2008), available at http://www.fed-soc.org
(follow "Publications" hyperlink) (arguing that the Court should not uphold
government imposed racial classifications).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124.
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 483 (Kennedy, J., joining Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Kennedy, J., joining Alito,
J., concurring).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124.
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920-22 (2000).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168.
Id. at 161, 164.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 708-11
(2007).
/d. at 782, 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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took a very narrow view of Congress's power to regulate the
financing of political campaigns. 284 In the case limiting the free
speech rights of high school students, 285 Justice Kennedy joined
Justice Alito's concurring opinion describing the Court's holding as a
narrow one that "provide[d] no support for any restriction of speech
that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or
social issue .... " 286
The procedural cases reflected the current Court's willingness to
limit access to the courts and to appeals. 287 In all three cases, Justice
Kennedy joined the conservative majority without amplifying his
views. Justice Alito's opinion in the first case concluded that
subsequent effects of past discrimination do not restart the clock for
an equal employment charge. 288 Justice Thomas authored the
majority opinion in the other two cases. One opinion ruled that an
application for a writ of certiorari from a denial of a state habeas
corpus petition does not toll the one-year statute of limitations for
filing a federal petition. 289 The other opinion refused to extend the
fourteen-day period to file a notice of appeal for a denial of a habeas
corpus application even though the district court had signed an order
allowing seventeen days for the filing. 290
The last two five to four decisions in which Justice Kennedy sided
with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
involved issues of statutory construction. Rejecting a long-standing
precedent in antitrust law/91 Justice Kennedy authored an opinion
that subjected vertical price restraints to the rule of reason normally
used in antitrust cases. 292 He also joined an opinion by Justice Alito
holding that the Endangered Species Ace93 requirement that federal
agencies consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding any
proposed federal action that might jeopardize an endangered
284.
285.
286.
287.

288.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 483, 502-D3 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., joining Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).
!d. at 422 (Ali to, J., concurring).
See Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court-What a Difference a
Single Justice Can Make: The 2006-2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court,
29 WHITIIER L. REV. I, 5 (2007).
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(amending 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)).
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329 (2007).
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206-D7 (2007).
See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
See Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 880-82 (2007).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
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species, 294 did not apply to federal approval of a state permit program
under the Clean Water Act. 295
All but one of the cases in which Justice Kennedy joined with
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer involved the standing
and capital punishment issues described above. 296 The remaining
decision concerned the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion by
Justice Stevens concluded that a bankruptcy judge could deny a
petition to convert a liquidation to a reorganization when the debtor
misrepresented the value of property in the bankruptcy estate. 297
The majority did. not form along the Court's normal ideological
divisions in the five remaining cases with only a five-member
majority. 298 In each of these cases, Justice Kennedy joined a majority
opinion written by another Justice without a separate amplification of
his views. 299
The Court produced the same majority - Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Alito-in only two of these
cases that crossed the usual ideological divide. 300 The most
significant was undoubtedly Justice Breyer's opinion concluding that
a punitive damages award based, in part, on the jury's desire to
punish a defendant for harming nonparties was a denial of due
process. 301 In the other decision from this majority, Justice Alito's
majority opinion concluded that attempted burglary was a "violent
felony" under a federal sentencing statute. 302
The remaining three decisions involved different majorities on
relatively narrow issues. Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Stevens and Alito joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion allowing
294.

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

300.
301.

302.

See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (prohibiting completion
of a dam where operation of the dam placed endangered species at risk). See
MURCHISON, supra note 3, at 126-35, for a detailed description of the Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. Hill opinion.
Nat'! Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Defenders ofWildlife, 551 U.S. 664,649-50 (2007).
See supra pp. 30-33.
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374-75 (2007).
See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (five to three decision,
Justice Thomas not participating).
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Watters, 550 U.S. 1; Limtiaco v.
Camacho, 549 U.S. 483 (2007); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007);
Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007).
James, 550 U.S. 192; Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. 346.
Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 349. See generally Thomas Colby, Clearing the
Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive
Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392 (2008) (criticizing the rationale in Philip Morris USA,
but concluding that the Court correctly held punitive damages must only punish harm
done to an individual rather than the general public).
James, 550 U.S. at 195.
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the United States to remove a tort suit against a federal employee to
federal court. 303 Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Scalia and Breyer joined Justice Thomas in holding that the debt
limitation for the Territory of Guam must be calculated using the
assessed valuation of property in the territory rather than the
appraised value of the property. 304 Finally, Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Breyer, and Alito joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion holding that a
state could not regulate the mortgage subsidiary of a national bank. 305
C.

2007 Term

Justice Kennedy's increased influence continued to manifest itself
in the 2007 Term, although the numbers were not quite as dramatic as
the previous year. As in the 2005 Term, a first glance seems to
suggest a break in the pattern, but closer scrutiny confirms Justice
Kennedy's continuing influence m directing the future of
constitutional doctrine.
Justice Kennedy was less consistently a member of the majority in
the 2007 Term than he was in the 2006 Term. He dissented ten
times/ 06 and he wrote four dissenting opinions. 307 More significantly,
he was a member of the minority in four of sixteen cases in which the

303. Osborn, 549 U.S. at 231.
304. Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 484-85.
305. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (2007).
306. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joining the dissent of
Breyer, J.); Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2355 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198,
2204 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joining dissent of Breyer, J.); United States v. Santos, 128
S. Ct. 2020, 2035 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joining dissent of Alito, J.); Dep't of Revenue
of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1822 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Hall Street Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattei, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1408 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joining dissent of
Stevens, J.); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1197
(2008) (Kennedy, J., joining the dissent of Scalia, J.); Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.
Ct. 1029, 1047 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joining dissent of Roberts, C.J.); Ali v. Fed.
Bureau ofPrisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Roberts dissented only eight times, however, the dissents of the other Justices ranged
from twelve (Justice Alito) to seventeen (Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg).
Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 2007, 77 U.S.L.W. 3063 (August 5,
2008).
307. Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Metro. Life Ins., 128 S. Ct.
at 2355 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Davis, 128 S. Ct. at
1822 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 841 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Court had only a five-member majority/ 08 and he authored dissenting
opinions in two of those cases. 309
More careful analysis of the 2007 cases reveals that the dissents
summarized above do not alter Justice Kennedy's position as the
decisional fulcrum of the current Supreme Court when it is closely
divided on constitutional issues. Four of his ten dissents concerned
questions of statutory construction. 310 The constitutional cases
involved the dormant Commerce Clause 311 and the Confrontation
Clause, 312 issues where the Court's recent decisions cross its more
typical ideological divide; a facial challenge to Washington's open
primary; 313 and, the narrow question of whether states can give
Supreme Court decisions greater retroactive effect than the Court
itself gives them in federal litigation. 314 On most of the major
constitutional decisions, Justice Kennedy sided with the majority, and
his views are likely to define the contours of future doctrine. In
addition, he is likely to provide the crucial vote in resolving the
issues that were raised in the two cases that were affirmed by an
equally divided Court. 315
308.

309.
310.

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Irizarry, 128 S. Ct. at 2204
(Kennedy, J., joining dissent of Breyer, J.); Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2035 (Kennedy, J.,
joining dissent of Alito, J.); Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 841 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 841
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Metro. Life Ins., 128 S. Ct. at 2355 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2035 (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting opinion of Alito,
J.); Hall Street Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1408 (Kennedy, J., joining dissent of Stevens,
J.); Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 841 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joining dissenting
opinion of Breyer, J.).
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1203 (2008)
(Kennedy, J., joining dissent of Scalia, J. ).
Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1047, 1058 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joining
dissenting opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., not participating),
affg by an equally divided court Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d
Cir. 2007) (holding that federal drug law does not preempt a state law that recognizes
approval of the drug by the Food and Drug Administration as a defense to a product
liability claim only if the manufacturer of the drug did not intentionally withhold or
misrepresent information required to be submitted to the federal agency); Bd. of Educ.
v. Tom F. ex rei Gilbert F., 552 U.S. I (2007) (Kennedy, J., not participating), aff'g by
an equally divided court 193 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 01 Civ. 6845
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2005) (holding that parents could obtain reimbursement for private
school tuition under the Individuals with Educational Disabilities Act even if their
child was not enrolled in a public school at the time the parents rejected the public
school placement).
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In the 2007 Term, Justice Kennedy formed a majority with Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ali to in five of the
sixteen cases that had only a five-member majority, 316 and three of
those decisions involved important constitutional issues. In the first
of these decisions, an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that neither a judgment of the International Court of Justice nor a
presidential memorandum stating that the United States would satisfy
its international obligation by having state courts give effect to the
international decision required state courts to follow the decision
rather than the state's generally applicable rules governing successive
filing of petitions for habeas corpus. 317 In the second of the
constitutional decisions, Justice Scalia authored an opm10n
recognizing that the Second Amendment created a personal right to
possess handguns for self-defense. 318 That opinion is an unusual one
for Justice Scalia because it narrowly defines the new right and
leaves many important questions unresolved; an approach that
suggests Justice Kennedy's individualized balancing approach is
likely to have considerable influence in defining the future extent of

316. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008);
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). See infra notes
323 and 329 for the other eleven cases that had a five-member majority.
317. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356, 1358, 1372 (holding that International Court of Justice
decisions are not directly enforceable under domestic federal law and therefore the
Order did not preempt state limitations on filing of successive habeas corpus
petitions). See also Medellin v. Texas, 129 U.S. 360, 361-62 (2008) (denying a stay
of execution to give Congress time to order compliance with the decision of the
International Court of Justice). See generally Valerie Epps, The Medellin v. Texas
Symposium: A Case Worthy of Comment, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL L. REV. 209
(2007) (discussing Medellin v. Texas and the federal government's lack of inclination
to comply with the International Court of Justice orders).
318. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2787, 2822. Heller quickly generated a flood of commentary.
See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1343 (2009); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P.
Denning, Heller's Future in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REv. 2035 (2008);
Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of
Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB.
LAW. I (2009); Richard C. Schragger, The Last Progressive Justice: Justice Breyer,
Heller and "Judicial Judgment," 59 SYRACUSE L. REv. 283 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein,
Second Amendment Minima/ism: Heller As Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REv. 246 (2008);
Anders Walker, From Ballot to Bullets: District of Columbia v. Heller and the New
Civil Rights, 69 LA. L. REv. 509 (2009); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions,
and the Unraveling Rule ofLaw, 95 VA. L. REv. 253 (2009).
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the doctrine. 319 The third constitutional case in which Justice
Kennedy sided with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, involved campaign financing. 320
Not
surprisingly, Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's holding that
campaign financing provisions, which allowed a candidate to accept
larger contributions when facing an opponent who provided more
than $350,000 to his or her campaign from personal funds, were
unconstitutional. 321 However, Justice Kennedy would have gone
further than the majority. He joined Justice Scalia's concurrence
which urged the Court to reverse its earlier decision upholding the
campaign finance law against a facial challenge. 322
Justice Kennedy also joined the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito in two additional cases. He authored an opinion
narrowly defining when Section 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange
Ace 23 authorizes private actions for damages. 324 Additionally, Justice
Kennedy joined another opinion by Chief Justice Roberts. That
opinion denied an Indian tribal court jurisdiction over a claim that a
bank had discriminated against tribal members who defaulted on their
loan secured by land on the reservation. 325
In four cases, Justice Kennedy formed five-member majorities with
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer. 326 Two involved
significant constitutional questions, and Justice Kennedy authored the

319.

320.
321.
322.

323.
324.
325.
326.

See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816, 2822. See also Ilya Somin, Locked Liberties, XXXI,
No. 30, Legal Times, 42, 43 (2008) (discussing the narrowly defined new right in
Heller). The campaign finance cases form an important exception to this pattern.
See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 485-86,
489 (2007) (Ke~nedy, J., joining concurring opinion of Scalia, J.); Randall v. Sorrell,
548 U.S. 230, 264-65 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); McConnell
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 286-87 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't. PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 405, 409-10 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 449.
!d. at 457; see supra text accompanying note 168.
See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 483-85, 489-99 (Kennedy, J., and Thomas, JJ,
joining concurring opinion of Scalia, J.); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (Kennedy
concurred in the holding which upheld the campaign finance law, but later urged the
Court to overrule its decision following the holding in Fed. Election Comm 'n v. Wis.
Right to Life, Inc. as the two holdings were no longer consistent with one another).
15 u.s.c. § 78j(b) (2000).
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,769 (2008).
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2645 (2008); Sprint Comm. Co. v.
APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2533 (2008); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2239 (2008).
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majority opinions in both. 327 One upheld the availability of habeas
corpus review for Guantanamo Bay detainees who are being tried by
military commissions authorized by Congress. 328 The other ruled that
the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment for the crime of
raping a minor. 329 Justice Kennedy also wrote the opinion in a
nonconstitutional case in which the Court concluded that an alien
facing deportation must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw a
motion for voluntary departure from the United States, provided the
request is made before the departure period ends. 330 In the other
nonconstitutional case, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Breyer's
opinion holding that the assignee of a legal claim for money has
standing to litigate the underlying claim in federal court. 331
The Supreme Court divided along atypical lines in seven of the
sixteen cases with a five-member majority. 332 The seven cases
produced seven different majorities, although both Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas were members of the majority in six of
the cases. 333
Most of the cases involved issues of statutory
334
construction.
The only constitutional issue concerned the
respective rights of states over boundary waters. 335

327. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-46; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
328. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
329. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-46 (holding that under the Eighth Amendment, the death
penalty was unconstitutional when the crime of raping a minor did not result or intend
to result in the death of the victim).
330. Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2310--11 (2008) (holding that under the
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, every alien ordered
to be removed from the United States has a right to file one motion to reopen his or
her removal proceeding).
331. Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2533.
332. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC,
128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008); Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008); United
States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008); Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581
(2008); New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008).
333. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2605; Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2361; Irizarry, 128 S. Ct. at
2020; New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. at 1410; Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 831.
334. See, e.g., Irizarry, 128 S. Ct. at 2202-04 (determining the meaning of "variances" as
used in the sentencing and judgment statute of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines);
Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2023-27 (determining the meaning of "proceeds" as used in the
federal money-laundering statute); Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1583-88 (determining the
meaning of "violent felony" as used in the Armed Career Criminal Act); Ali, 128 S.
Ct. at 835-41 (determining the meaning of "law enforcement officer" as used in the
Federal Tort Claims Act).
335. New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. at 1427 (Court exercised original jurisdiction
under the Constitution because the controversy arose between two states).
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Justice Kennedy was a member of the majority in only three cases
with atypical majorities, and he did not author any of the majority
opinions in those cases. 336 Justice Kennedy, the Chief Justice, and
Justices Stevens and Ginsberg joined Justice Breyer's opinion
holding that driving under the influence was not a "violent felony"
for purposes of a federal sentence-enhancement provision. 337 Along
with the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice
Kennedy joined Justice Souter's opinion limiting punitive damages to
an amount equal to compensatory damages in admiralty cases. 338
Finally, Justice Kennedy together with the Chief Justice, and Justices
Souter and Thomas joined Justice Ginsberg's opinion upholding
Delaware's refusal to grant permission for construction of a liquefied
natural gas unloading terminal that would extend some 2,000 feet
from New Jersey's shore into territory ofDelaware. 339
Justice Kennedy wrote dissenting opinions in two of the cases with
atypical, five-member majorities. One dissenting opinion came in a
case in which Justice Thomas wrote for a majority including himself,
the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Ali to. 340 The
majority opinion concluded that the grant of tort immunity in a
federal statute extended to all federal law enforcement officers, not
just officers enforcing customs and excise laws. 341 Justice Kennedy's
other dissenting opinion involved the provision in Kentucky's
retirement system governing disability retirement for hazardous
positions. 342 Justice Breyer, speaking for a majority including
himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Thomas,
concluded that the provisions did not discriminate on the basis of
age.343
336. Only Justices Breyer and Ali to, each of whom was a member of the majority in two
cases, were less frequent members of the majority in these cases than Justice
Kennedy; but, both Justice Breyer and Justice Alito participated in just six of the
seven decisions. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (Alito, J., not participating); New Jersey v.
Delaware, 128 S. Ct. at 1427 (Breyer, J., not participating).
337. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1588.
338. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2633. Justice Alito did not participate in Exxon, and the result
might well have been different if he had participated. Before reaching the issue of the
amount of damages, an equally divided Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling that a
corporation could be liable in punitive damages for the acts of its managerial
employees. Jd. at 2616. Had Justice Alito voted to reverse the lower court op that
issue, the Supreme Court would never have reached the question of the amount of
punitive damages.
339. New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. at 1427.
340. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831,841 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
341. Jd. at 834 (majority opinion).
342. Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
343. Jd. at 2364 (majority opinion).
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In the final two cases, Justice Kennedy joined dissenting opinions
written by other Justices. In one, Justice Stevens wrote for a majority
including himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito/44 but Justice Kennedy joined Justice Breyer's dissent. 345 The
majority ruled that a trial judge had no duty to notify a defendant
before issuing a sentence that varied from the federal sentencing
guidelines. 346 In the final case, Justice Scalia authored a plurality
opinion for himself and Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg in a
case in which the Court ruled that "proceeds" of an illegal gambling
operation meant profits, not gross receipts. 347 Justice Stevens
concurred only in the judgment, 348 and Justice Kennedy joined Justice
Alito's dissent. 349

D. 2008 Term
The general pattern of the decisions since 2005 continued in the
2008 Term, although the Court's constitutional decisions were less
remarkable. 350 Justice Kennedy's six dissents for the 2008 Term
were the fewest of any Justice and less than half the total for Justice
Scalia, who had the next lowest number of dissents. 351 Although five
of Justice Kennedy's dissents came in cases in which the Supreme
Court divided five to four/ 52 that total was also the lowest of the

344. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008).
345. Jd. at 2204 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
346. See id. at 2201-02 (majority opinion) (affirming the appellate court's determination
that the notice rule did not apply because the sentence was a variance, rather than a
departure from sentencing guidelines).
347. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion).
348. I d. at 2031 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
349. Jd. at 2035 (Alito, J., dissenting).
350. In three cases, the Court had a five-member majority. In each of the decisions, Justice
Kennedy sided with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part, and Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); Pac.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comm., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., concurring in the judgment); Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (Breyer and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
351. Posting of Kristina Moore to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp
content/uploads/2009/06/summary-tally.pdf (June 29, 2009, 16:34 EST) (Justice
Scalia's total number of dissents for the 2008 Term was thirteen).
352. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part, with whom Roberts, C.J., Kennedy and Alito, JJ., joined);
Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting, with
whom Roberts, C.J., Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, with whom Roberts,
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Term for any Justice/ 53 and the dissents all involved criminal justice
issues or questions of statutory construction.
In the 2008 Term, the Court decided twenty-three cases with a fivemember majority, and Justice Kennedy was a member of the majority
in eighteen of them. 354 He joined Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in almost half of the five to four
decisions; 355 he sided with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer in five of them; 356 and he was a member of the majority in two
of the seven decisions in which the Court did not follow its normal
ideological division. 357
Perhaps the most important decision of the 2008 Term involved an
order rather than an opinion. At the end of the Term, the Court
issued an order providing for reargument in a campaign finance
case. 358 The order directed the parties to brief and argue the question
of whether the Court should reconsider its opinion upholding the
constitutionality of the federal campaign finance law against a facial
challenge. 359
The eleven cases in which Justice Kennedy joined opinions to form
a majority with the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, covered a wide variety of issues. This group of decisions

353.
354.
355.

356.

357.

C.J., Breyer and Alito, JJ., joined); Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009) (Breyer,
J ., dissenting and Ali to, J ., with whom Roberts, C.J ., Kennedy, J ., join dissenting, and
with whom Breyer, J., joins dissenting, except as to Part 11-E); Spears v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam decision where Kennedy, J., would have
granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, Thomas, J., dissenting and Roberts, C.J.,
with whom Alito, J.,joined dissenting).
Moore, supra note 351.
Moore, supra note 3 51.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009);
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009); Dist. Attorney's Office for the
Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.
Ct. 2079 (2009); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009); 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009); Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
Caperton v. A. T. Masey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); United States v. Denedo,
129 S. Ct. 2213 (2009); Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009); Corley v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined);
Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, and Ali to, JJ., joined).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comrn'n, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009).

358.
359. !d.
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included constitutional questions, problems of statutory construction,
and procedural issues. 360
Justice Kennedy formed a majority with the right-leaning Justices
in five constitutional decisions. He joined an opinion by Justice
Scalia denying an environmental organization the right to challenge
Forest Service regulations without a current dispute over the
application of the regulations/61 but he added a concurring opinion, 362
as he has frequently done in standing cases. He also wrote the
majority opinion in a decision holding that to establish a
constitutional tort claim, a plaintiff has to plead sufficient facts to
show that the government official had adopted and implemented a
policy for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion,
or national origin. 363 The three remaining constitutional decisions
narrowed the rights of individuals accused of crimes. One decision
overturned the judicially created rule forbidding interrogation of a
suspect after the suspect has retained counsel. 364 The second decision
held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to an unconstitutional
search that results from isolated negligence attenuated from the
search, 365 and the third decision rejected the claim that a defendant
who has been convicted has a constitutional right to obtain postconviction access to the state's evidence for DNA testing. 366 Justice
Kennedy concurred silently in the last two decisions, but in the case
allowing interrogation of a suspect who has requested counsel, he
joined Justice Alita's concurring opinion, adding to Justice Scalia's
majority opinion. Justice Alita's concurrence is significant because it
argued for a broad authority to overrule decisions that a new majority
thinks were wrongly decided. 367
The statutory construction cases raised a diverse set of issues. One
of the most important of these cases used statutory grounds to
narrow, once again, the ability of governments to use race-based
360. See, e.g., Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 704 (holding that the exclusionary rule for the
suppression of evidence would not apply for police recording errors); 14 Penn Plaza
L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. at 1460 (holding that a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement requires union members to arbitrate Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 claims); Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1946 (holding that the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction to hear the petitioner's appeal).
361. Sze Summers v. Earth Island lnst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009).
362. Jd. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
363. Ashcroft v.lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942, 1952 (2009).
364. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086-87 (2009).
365. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009).
366. Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312
(2009).
367. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092-93 (Alito, J., concurring).
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affirmative action programs. 368 The majority held that the decision of
a city not to use a civil service test for promotions because of its
racially disparate effects violated the Civil Rights Act. 369 As he did
when the Court reached a similar result on constitutional grounds in
Parents Involved, 370 Justice Kennedy added a concurring opinion. 371
The other statutory construction cases involved the Voting Rights
Act, 372 employment law, 373 and the Federal Communications
Commission. 374 Justice Kennedy concurred silently in the
employment decisions, but he authored the plurality opinion in the
voting rights case 375 and added a concurring opinion in the case
involving the Federal Communications Commission. 376
The last decision in which Justice Kennedy joined the right-leaning
majority involved a procedural issue. He was a silent member of the
majority when the Court broadly defined the ability of state officials
to seek relief from a prior injunction. 377
Three of the five cases in which Justice Kennedy sided with
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer involved
constitutional issues. He authored the opinion concluding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required recusal
of a judge who had received very large campaign contributions from
one of the litigants before the Court 378 and was a silent member of the
majority in two preemption cases. In one of the preemption cases,
the Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act did not
preempt a state unfair practice law. 379 In the second case, the Court
ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 preempted a state statute that required
prisoner claims to be filed in the state court of claims. 380
368.
369.
3 70.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
Id.
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (plurality opinion).
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009); 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett,
129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1238. The plurality opinion held that Section Two only
authorizes a vote dilution claim when a racial minority would constitute a majority of
the voting age population in a district. See id. at 1243. Justices Thomas and Scalia
concurred on the ground that Section Two never authorizes a vote dilution claim. ld.
at 1250 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Home v. Pores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2607 (2009) (holding that a state may challenge the
statewide extension of an injunction originally granted to a specific school district).
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009).
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538,551 (2008).
Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108,2117-18 (2009).
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The other two cases in which Justice Kennedy formed a majority
with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, involved
statutory issues. In one case, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Souter's
majority opinion holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 narrowed, but did not
overrule, the judicial rule that a confession is inadmissible if obtained
during an unreasonably long period of detention between arrest and
preliminary hearing. 381 In the other case, Justice Kennedy authored
the majority opinion concluding that the All Writs Act granted
military courts the authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct
errors in their judgments. 382
Four of the seven decisions decided by a majority that crossed the
Court's normal ideological lines raised criminal justice issues.
Together with Justices Breyer and Alito, Justice Kennedy joined
Justice Stevens's opinion allowing judges rather than juries to decide
whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent. 383 However,
he dissented in the other three opinions, each of which had a different
majority. In the case of a per curiam reversal that allowed a
sentencing court to ignore the sentencing guidelines for crack
cocaine, 384 Justice Kennedy would have granted the petition for
certiorari and set the case for oral argument. 385 In the other cases, he
dissented on the merits. When the Court limited the authority of
police officers to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, 386
he joined Justice Alito's dissent. 387 When a majority ruled that the
Confrontation Clause applied to certificates from state laboratories, 388
he wrote a dissenting opinion that the Chief Justice and Justices
Breyer and Alito joined. 389
Two cases decided by majorities that crossed ideological lines
involved issues of statutory construction. Justice Kennedy was a
silent member of the majority in a decision involving the Federal
Arbitration Act. 390 When the Court held that the National Banking
Act did not preclude a state attorney general from enforcing the state

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1571 (2009).
United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213,2224 (2009).
Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 712 (2009).
Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843-44 (2009) (per curiam).
!d. at 845 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1712-13 (2009).
!d. at 1726 (A1ito, J., dissenting).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
!d. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1267 (2009).
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fair-lending laws through judicial proceedings, 391 he joined the
dissent of Justice Thomas. 392
Justice Kennedy was also a member of the minority when Justice
Thomas joined the more liberal Justices in a maritime case at the end
of the Term. Justice Thomas's majority opinion held that general
maritime law permitted the recovery of punitive damages for a ship
owner's willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure
obligations. 393 Together with the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy joined the dissent of Justice Alito. 394
III. FUTURE INFLUENCE
The decisions of the first four Terms since Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito joined the Supreme Court confirm that Justice
Kennedy is the crucial Justice in closely divided constitutional cases.
He most commonly sides with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, but he has joined Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in some cases, and with majorities that cross
normal ideological lines in others. Taken as a group, the cases since
2005 demonstrate the likely shape of constitutional doctrine under the
current Supreme Court. Moreover, they indicate that whether
significant change occurs in particular areas depends largely on the
vote of Justice Kennedy.
One can anticipate little change in two groups of decisions: those
where Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor previously joined with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas to form a
majority, and those in which Justice Kennedy (and, sometimes,
Justice O'Connor) previously joined with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer to form a majority. In both groups of
decisions, a five-member majority remains despite Justice Alito's
replacement of Justice O'Connor. Justice Kennedy's delineation of
the doctrinal limits is, however, likely to be crucial in some of those
areas because he has written concurring opinions that qualify the
views expressed in majority opinions.
By contrast, significant modifications are more likely to occur in
those types of cases where Justice Kennedy dissented and where
Justice O'Connor joined with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer to form a majority. Once again, Justice Kennedy's views are
likely to dominate those areas in the future because he often

391.
392.
393.
394.

Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721 (2009).

!d. at 2722 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
At!. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2575 (2009).

!d. at 2575 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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distinguishes his opinion from the more absolute views of Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Justice Kennedy's views are also likely to be
important in cases involving economic due process, even though the
Court has tended to split along non-ideological lines. Finally, Justice
Kennedy's views are likely to be crucial in future litigation regarding
the newly-recognized right under the Second Amendment. The
paragraphs that follow summarize some of these areas where Justice
Kennedy's views are likely to be influential in the future.
A. Federalism Issues
As noted above, Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor both joined
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in using
principles of federalism to impose new limits to congressional
power. 395 One can, however, detect subtle differences in the
doctrines Justices Kennedy and O'Connor articulated. On issues of
congressional power, Justice Kennedy was more willing than Justice
O'Connor to uphold the authority of Congress to use comprehensive
statutes to regulate interstate commerce. 396 He was, however, less
willing to allow Congress to grant private individuals damage
remedies against states either by grounding the statute in Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment or by creating
exceptions to the prohibition against private damage actions in
statutes based on congressional powers enumerated in Article I. 397
Cases before and after Justice O'Connor left the Court show that
Justice Kennedy's view of the Commerce Clause is somewhat
broader than the views of the other members of the new federalism
majority. He joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion holding that
comprehensive federal statutes did not have to create exceptions for
noneconomic activities that do not substantially affect interstate
commerce. 398 More recently, he wrote a concurring opinion that
effectively modified the narrow definition of the reach of the Clean
Water Act announced in Justice Scalia's plurality opinion. 399
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy has consistently supported the
Court's 1996 decision holding that the Commerce Clause does not
authorize Congress to create damage remedies against the states. 400

395. See supra Part I.A.
396. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 58-62, 67-73 and accompanying text.
398. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2005).
399. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
400. Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
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He concurred in decisions reaffirming the principle, 401 and he
authored the opinion holding that this immunity applied to suits in
state court as well as claims filed in federal court. 402 He also
supported extending Commerce Clause immunity to federal power
under the Patent and Copyright Clause, 403 as well as to administrative
adjudications. 404 Most significantly, he voted with Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas in dissent in 2006 when
Justice O'Connor joined the majority holding that Congress could
subject states to bankruptcy claims. 405 Justice Kennedy has also
regularly opposed congressional attempts to use its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment to circumvent state immunity against
damage actions. 406 He adhered to his position even when Chief
Justice Rehnquist authored a majority opinion407 upholding
Congress's power to subject states to private actions for violations of
the Family Medical Leave Act, 408 and when Justice O'Connor
abandoned the federalism majority to allow private actions for
damages when a state denied a disabled individual access to the
courts. 409
As far as federalism limits on state power are concerned, the
Supreme Court has continued since 2005 to address preemption
claims regarding both state regulations 410 and private claims for
401. See, e.g., Bd. ofTrs. ofUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 99 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
402. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
403. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Coli. Savings Bank. v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coli. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
404. Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002).
405. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
406. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-90
(Kennedy J., dissenting).
407. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 744 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
408. 29 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2608 (2000).
409. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004).
410. See Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2117 (2009) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
preempts a state statute that required prisoner claims to be filed in the state court of
claims); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551 (2008) (holding that the
Federal Cigarette Labeling Act does not preempt a state unfair practice law); Chamber
of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408,2412 (2008) (finding that the National Labor
Relations Act preempts state statute that prevented funding of grants meant to "assist,
promote, or deter union organizing"); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct.
989, 991 (2008) (finding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act
preempts state statutes governing the delivery of tobacco products); Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007) (finding that the National Banking Act
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damages under state law,411 as well as dormant Commerce Clause
issues when no federal statute covers the area. 412 As was true prior to
2005, the Court has not generally been narrowly divided in the
preemption cases. 413 However, in three cases with a five-member
majority, Justice Kennedy was a part of the majority. 414 By contrast,
Justice Kennedy was a member of the minority in both cases
involving the dormant Commerce Clause. 415
B.

Separation ofPowers Questions

Standing doctrine is the area in which Justice Kennedy has most
clearly articulated a distinctive view of separation of powers, and the
cases since 2005 confirm that his views are likely to remain pivotal
now that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alita have joined the
Court. Although he frequently joined the decisions limiting standing,
he has articulated two particular positions that are likely to prove
influential on the new Court. He joined opinions allowing Congress
to permit private enforcement of environmental statutes by persons
who use the resource that the violator has polluted416 and holding that

411.

412.

413.
414.

415.
416.

precludes application of state mortgage lending regulations to subsidiaries of a
national bank).
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (2008) (holding that the Food and
Drug Act preapproval of a balloon catheter preempted claims of negligence, strict
liability, and implied warranty against the manufacturer); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 74 (2006) (holding that the Security
Litigation Uniform Standards Act preempts claims by holders of securities alleging
fraudulent manipulation of stock prices).
See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008) (holding that the
income tax structure, which exempted interest on bonds issued by Kentucky or its
subdivisions from state income tax, but taxed interest income on bonds from other
states and their subdivisions, did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause); United
Hauler's Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342
(2007) (holding that county flow control ordinances that required businesses hauling
waste in counties to bring waste to facilities owned and operated by publicly owned
corporation did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
See Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2408; Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 989; Riegel, 128
S. Ct. at 999; Dabit, 547 U.S. at 71.
Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2108; A/tria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 538; Watters, 550 U.S. at 1.
Justice Kennedy was part of a four-member minority when the Court held that the
National Banking Act did not preclude judicial enforcement of state fair lending laws
against national banks. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721
(2009) (Kennedy, J., joining Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1801; United Hauler's Ass 'n, 550 U.S. at 330.
Friends ofthe Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2000).
See generally William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw: Standing and Citizen
Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 201 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J.
Lazarus eds., 2004).
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states have even broader powers to seek judicial redress under
environmental statutes. 417 Both positions reject the narrow
interpretation of injury that Justice Scalia has articulated in several
cases denying standing in environmental cases. 418
Justice Kennedy has also articulated a centrist position with respect
to detainees in the so-called "war on terrorism." He allowed
detainees to challenge their detentions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; 419
refused to allow the President to try detainees by military commission
without express congressional authorization; 420 and recognized the
right of detainees to appeal convictions by military commissions to
civilian courts even when the military commissions had been
authorized by Congress. 421 On the other hand, he was willing to
imply presidential authority to detain suspected terrorists, 422 and he
concurred in the dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus because it
was not filed in the district where the individual was being held by
military authorities. 423
As the decisions discussed in this section indicate, Justice Kennedy
has continued to support a broad view of the judicial function. He
joined the right-leaning majority to recognize judicially enforceable
rights under the Second Amendment,424 but also supported expanding
limits on the death penalty, 425 and refused to agree that all uses of
race in affirmative action programs was unconstitutional. 426
C.

Protection ofIndividual Rights

The recent Terms confirm that Justice Kennedy's views have
already significantly altered constitutional doctrine with respect to
several individual rights. In the first four Terms since Justice
O'Connor retired, the Court has issued important decisions regarding
a woman's right to choose an abortion, 427 the use of race in
affirmative action programs, 428 free speech, 429 the death penalty, 430
417. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,518-19 (2007).
418. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Lujan v.
Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n (Lujan_!), 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
419. Rasu1 v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,485 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
420. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 653 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
421. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2261-62 (2008).
422. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004).
423. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 453-55 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
424. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,2799 (2008).
425. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641,2646 (2008).
426. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789-90
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
427. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
428. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701.
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and the Second Amendment. 431 In all of these areas, Justice Kennedy
was an essential member of the majority.
The abortion and affirmative action cases marked the triumph of
positions that Justice Kennedy had previously urged in dissent.
Although Justice Kennedy ostensibly applied the "undue burden"
test432 in the most recent abortion case, his articulation of the test
gave significantly greater weight to the state's desire to protect the
potential of human life and allowed the statute to survive a facial
challenge even though it lacked an exception to protect the health of
the pregnant woman. 433 Similarly, Justice Kennedy refused to forbid
all uses of race in affirmative action programs in the secondary
school case that the Court decided in 2007. 434 He continued,
however, to examine race-based classifications with great suspicion,
as he had done when dissenting in the case involving the admissions
program at the University of Michigan Law School. 435 One can,
therefore, anticipate that the Court will be less willing to uphold racebased programs now that Justice Kennedy, rather than Justice
O'Connor, is the determinative Justice on this issue. Indeed,
supporters of affirmative action might fear that the new composition
of the Court will lead the Court to overrule the Michigan Law School
case if it decides to review another affirmative action program
involving university admissions.
With respect to the First Amendment, the recent opinions go in
conflicting directions. The Court expanded the protections for those
financing political campaigns, 436 but narrowed them for public
employers and students. 437
On campaign financing, Justice Kennedy had previously advocated
greater First Amendment protection than the Court's majority had

429. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
430. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641; Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286 (2007); Smith
v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007).
431. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
432. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 948-51 (2000); Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-79 (1992).
433. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147, 161 (2007). Justice Kennedy dissented in the
earlier case. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
434. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-88
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
435. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
436. Davis v. Fed. Election Comrn'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771-73 (2008); Fed. Election
Comrn'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,481 (2007).
437. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421
(2006).
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recognized. 438 Thus, one can hardly find it surprising that Justice
Kennedy joined the 2007 decision that invalidated the federal
prohibition against "issue ads" in political campaigns as applied to
particular advertisements439 and the 2008 decision invalidating the
federal provision allowing candidates to accept larger contributions
when they faced an opponent personally financing his or her
campaign. 440 However, his decision in 2007 to join Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion441 that would have reversed the 2003 decision
upholding the federal prohibition against a facial challenge is
noteworthy. 442 Indeed, the June 2009 order directing the parties to
address the constitutional issue in a special September reargument of
a campaign finance case suggests that the reversal Justices Scalia and
Kennedy sought may come sooner rather than later. 443
On the other hand, the decisions involving speech by a student and
a public employee both restricted free speech rights. 444 The case
involving the student was Justice Kennedy's first case involving free
speech in the public school context, but he had previously joined an
opinion narrowly defining First Amendment rights in the public
employment context. 445
The Court's death penalty cases provide clear confirmation of
Justice Kennedy's enhanced position as the pivotal Justice on the
Court in cases involving individual rights. On the procedural issues
that arise with some regularity, his vote ordinarily determines
whether the death sentence will be affirmed or reversed. 446 He also
provided the crucial vote and wrote the opinion in the case declaring
the death penalty unconstitutional for the rape of a child. 447
Beyond these cases, the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito is likely to give Justice Kennedy's position new
importance in at least three other areas involving individual rights:
establishment of religion, procedural due process for terrorism
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 286-87 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 452.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759.
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 483 (Scalia, J., concurring).
McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (June 29, 2009) (mem.),
prob juris. noted, !29 S. Ct. 594 (2008).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421
(2006).
See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 686 (1994) (Kennedy, J., joining concurring
opinion of Scalia, J.).
See supra notes 164, 207-{}8 and accompanying text.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2645 (2008).
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detainees, and the Second Amendment. In the religion cases, Justice
Kennedy's subtle differences from Justice O'Connor448 are significant
now that he is the pivotal Justice. The outcome of the detainee cases
remains one of the most uncertain issues before the Court, 449 and
Justice Kennedy's balancing approach is likely to be determinative.
The recognition of an individual right to self-defense under the
Second Amendment450 is likely to produce a flood of litigation. Once
again, Justice Kennedy's views will be crucial in defining the reach
of the new right.
IV. THREE CAYEATS
Predicting the future direction of Supreme Court decisions is
always risky. Isolating any one factor as this Article has done, means
ignoring others that may push in a different direction. This section
briefly discusses three factors that might make Justice Kennedy's
influence somewhat less significant than the preceding paragraphs
have predicted.
A.

Stare Decisis

At first glance, the doctrine of stare decisis seems to have the
potential to impose a substantial limit on how much Justice Kennedy
might change constitutional doctrine in the immediate future. 451 After
all, stare decisis was a principal ground on which Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter defended their decision to preserve the
"essential holding" of Roe v. Wade. 452 One might, therefore, expect
that a similar commitment to the doctrine will preclude Justice
Kennedy from reversing other recent decisions where he was
previously a member of the minority now that another Justice more
aligned with his views has replaced Justice O'Connor.
When one looks more generally at Justice Kennedy's opinions,
however, stare decisis does not appear to have significantly limited
his positions as a member of the Supreme Court. As the abortion
case itself reveals, the refusal to overrule a decision does not preclude
substantial modification of the doctrines articulated in the case that is
448.

See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Lee v. Weisman, 505

u.s. 577 (1992).
449.
450.
451.

452.

See supra notes 87-90, 328 and accompanying text.
See District ofCo1umbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008).
For recent articles analyzing the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication, see
Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions and Answers, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1173 (2008); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in
Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEx. L. REv. 929 (2008).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854--69 (1992).
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reaffirmed. In addition, Justice Kennedy has not been bashful in
reversing prior opinions in other cases when he agrees with a new
majority position that the earlier decision was wrong.
Modification of doctrine is a powerful mechanism for changing the
law. As noted above, the reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade did not
preclude the Court from upholding most of the state regulations
challenged in the 1992 case,453 and decisions in the 2006 Term reflect
Justice Kennedy's continued willingness to modify doctrines
significantly without overruling them. 454 For instance, by modifying
the meaning of the "undue burden" test that defines the limits of
governmental power to regulate abortions, his opinion for the Court455
sustained a federal statute456 that would almost certainly have been
invalid under Justice O'Connor's previous application of the same
test. 457 Similarly, his concurring opinion in the recent school
desegregation case458 showed greater willingness to overturn racebased affirmative action programs than Justice O'Connor had
demonstrated when she was the pivotal Justice in the University of
Michigan Law School case. 459
Justice Kennedy has also been willing to reverse prior holdings
when a new majority will join him. During the Rehnquist Court era,
three of the most notable examples of this were decisions involving
the death penalty for the mentally retarded, 460 juveniles461 and
criminal prosecutions for homosexual conduct. 462 In the 2006 Term,
two of the five to four decisions confirmed Justice Kennedy's
willingness to overrule precedents that he believed were incorrectly
decided. In the antitrust case, his opinion for the Court replaced the
per se rule established in a 1911 decision463 with a rule of reason for
evaluating the legality of vertical price restraints. 464 Similarly, he
joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in the campaign finance
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (upholding all but one of the abortion restrictions
challenged in the case).
See supra Part II.B.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp.IV 2000).
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also id. at 387 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305-07 (2002).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,554-56 (2005).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
See Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,890 (2007).
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case. 465 Rather than simply distinguishing the Court's opinion
upholding the 2002 campaign finance law against a facial challenge
from the case before the Court,466 Justice Scalia advocated
abandoning the earlier precedent. 467 In the 2008 Term, Justice
Kennedy provided the crucial vote in a decision overturning the rule
forbidding interrogation of a suspect after the suspect has requested
counsel. 468
Taken together, these opinions indicate that precedents are not
likely to be a significant obstacle when Justice Kennedy wants to
reshape constitutional doctrine. The cases discussed above suggest
that Justice Kennedy will generally prefer to modify doctrines to
achieve the result he prefers. However, they also demonstrate that he
will not hesitate to reverse decisions in which he was a member of
the minority when he regards the decisions as having wrongly
decided important issues.
B.

The Possibility ofFuture Changes in Justice Kennedy's Thought

Because Supreme Court Justices hold tenure during good
behavior, 469 a change in a Justice's views while he or she is a member
of the Court can modify constitutional law significantly. 470 Indeed, a
recent article documents that Justice Kennedy's views have drifted to
the left, especially during his first decade on the Court,471 and one can
certainly identify areas, such as capital punishment, where he has
changed his position. 472 Nonetheless, dramatic changes in the future
465. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,483 (2007).
466. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
467. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (Scalia, J., concurring).
468. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). In Montejo, Justice Kennedy also
joined Justice Alito's concurring opinion that strongly affirmed the right of a new
majority to overrule any decision that it believes was wrongly decided. id. at 2092
(Alito, J., concurring).
469. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
470. See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal,
ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How important?,
101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1483 (2007) (discussing the substantial doctrinal changes
resulting from the ideologies of Justices).
471. id. at 1505-09.
472. Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of capital punishment for offenders who were
minors at the time their crimes were committed), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not forbid the imposition of
capital punishment for offenders who were minors at the time their crimes were
committed), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment restricts a state's power to impose capital punishment on a mentally
retarded offender), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the
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seem less likely.
For one thing, Justice Kennedy's centrist
ideological position has been relatively constant for the last decade. 473
Moreover, he has been a member of the Court for more than twenty
years and has articulated positions in the most important areas of
constitutional law. The likelihood that he will decide that any of
those positions are fundamentally mistaken in the future seems small.
To suggest that Justice Kennedy's constitutional thought is firmly
established does not mean that his vote will always be easy to predict.
In a variety of areas, Justice Kennedy has articulated positions that
require individualized consideration of the facts in the particular case.
This individualized approach extends to many important areas
including standing, 474 abortion regulation, 475 affirmative action, 476
protections for homosexuals, 477 and the due process rights of
individuals detained on charges of supporting terrorism. 478 In all of
those areas, commentators may frequently find it difficult to predict
how Justice Kennedy will analyze the particular facts before the
Court in specific cases.
C.

Future Changes in the Court

Most obviously, new Supreme Court appointments could change
the significance of Justice Kennedy's position on the Court. This
qualification is an important one because it is likely that President
Barack Obama will make several appointments. The recent stability
of the Court's membership for a decade is unusual in United States
history, and it is unlikely to repeat in the next decade. Justice Souter
retired from the Court at the end of the 2008 Term, 479 Justice John
Paul Stevens will be eighty-nine years old in 2009,480 and Justice
Ginsburg, who will be seventy-six, is reported to have health

473.
474.

475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

Eighth Amendment does not preclude imposition of capital punishment for mentally
retarded offenders).
See Epstein, supra note 471, at 1509, 1536 fig.19.
See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 110 {1998) (O'Connor,
J., concurring joined by Kennedy, J.); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
579 ( 1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004).
Adam Liptak, Poetry, As Souter Takes Leave, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A.B.
Robert Barnes, From Justice Stevens, No Exit Signs; As Obama Term Nears, Court
Watcher's Eyes Are on Oldest Member, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 2008, at A.25.
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problems that might incline her to retire. 481 Thus, President Obama
may well have as many as two appointments to make.
Although President Ronald Reagan appointed Justice Kennedy, his
influence is likely to continue unabated because a Democrat was
elected President. As the recent nomination of Justice Sotomayor has
revealed, anyone President Obama appoints to replace Justice
Stevens or Justice Ginsburg will almost certainly be more closely
allied with Justice Breyer than with the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Indeed, one of the issues most discussed
at Justice Sotomayor's confirmation hearing was her joining the
affirmative action decision that was reversed in the 2008 Term by a
five-member majority consisting of Justice Kennedy together with
the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. 482 Thus,
Justice Kennedy is likely to remain the decisive vote when the Court
divides five to four.
A Republican president would have been likely to appoint either
centrists in the mold of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy or, more
likely, conservatives like Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
Either type of appointment would reduce the significance of Justice
Kennedy's vote. For example, if two or three centrists were
appointed to the Court, the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Ali to would have a majority whenever one of the centrists joined
with them. By contrast, all of the centrists would have to join the
left-leaning Justices to produce a majority. Justice Kennedy's
influence would decline even further if a Republican president had
been elected and had appointed additional conservatives in the
Roberts-Alito model. Even one more conservative would create a
conservative majority that could overrule the decisions where Justice
Kennedy joined with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
to form a majority.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foreseeable future, one may appropriately describe the
present Supreme Court as the Kennedy Court because Justice
Kennedy's opinion will generally define the Supreme Court's

481. Adam Liptak, Justice Ginsberg Undergoes Surgery for Pancreatic Cancer, Court
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A.12.
482. Ricci v. DeStefano, 264 F. App'x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd, No. 07-428, slip op.
(U.S. 2009). See also Dana Milbank, FireFighters But No Brimstone, WASH. POST,
Jul. 17, 2009, at A.2 (discussing Ricci and its' effect on Justice Sotomayor's
confirmation hearing).
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position in cases where the Court is closely divided. 483 As a result,
the Supreme Court is likely to adhere to doctrines established when
he has been in the majority in the past and to modify or to overrule
doctrines where he previously joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas in dissent.
The alignments that are most likely to prove stable are those
present in cases where Justice Kennedy has been a member of the
majority. This group includes both cases in which Justice Kennedy
and Justice O'Connor formed a majority with Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, and those in which Justice Kennedy
joined with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to form a
majority. These cases cover a wide range of issues including limits
on federal power, standing, and the death penalty cases. In many of
these areas, Justice Kennedy has placed a peculiar stamp on the
individual doctrine either by authoring the majority opinion or
articulating a position that qualifies the doctrine set forth in the
opinion for the majority that he has joined. To the extent that the
narrow majorities in these cases produce differences of emphasis,
Justice Kennedy's position is likely to be determinative because he
will be the member of the majority most likely to form a different
majority with the dissenters.
By contrast, constitutional doctrine is less likely to remain stable in
cases in which Justice Kennedy has previously been a member of the
minority because Justice O'Connor previously formed a majority
with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Because Justice
Alito is less likely to remain with that majority, Justice Kennedy is
likely to be the swing Justice, and his views are likely to define the
extent of the shift in constitutional doctrine. Important areas of
constitutional doctrine that are subject to this potential shift include
the prohibition against federal statutes granting private remedies
against states, regulations of abortions, limits on campaign financing,
race-based affirmative action programs, free speech rights of students

483. For other analyses of the direction of the Court's decisions since John Roberts became
Chief Justice, see Erwin Chermerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 335,
335-36 (2006); Erwin Chermerinsky, When It Matters Most, It Is Still the Kennedy
Court, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 427, 427-28 (2008); Erwin Chermerinsky, The Roberts
Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 947,947-48 (2008); Julie M. Cheslik, Andrea
McMurtry, & Kristin Underwood, Supreme Court Report 2006-2007: Closing of the
Courthouse Doors?, 39 URB. LAW. 739, 741 (2007). For the argument that the future
direction of constitutional doctrine is likely to be significantly influenced by the
overwhelmingly conservative leanings of the judges on the courts of appeal, see
Maxwell L. Steams, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical
Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875,975-76 (2008).
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and public employees, the protections afforded by the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, and the scope of
the Second Amendment.
Justice Kennedy's influence is unlikely to wane over the next
several Terms. Despite his joining the plurality opinion in Casey, 484
stare decisis will not substantially limit his ability to change existing
constitutional doctrine. In the past, he has been willing to distinguish
or overrule Rehnquist precedents with which he disagreed, 485 and he
continued both practices in the recent Terms. 486 Given the length of
Justice Kennedy's service on the Court, fundamental changes in his
views seem unlikely. Nonetheless, commentators may find it hard to
predict his vote in close cases because he tends to favor doctrines that
require individualized consideration of the facts. If his influence
diminishes, it will most likely occur because of changes in the Court;
however, the election of Barack Obama will limit the significance of
those changes. 487 Ironically, Justice Kennedy's influence is likely to
remain pivotal because the country elected a Democratic President.
The general direction of a Court in which Justice Kennedy is the
pivotal Justice will be a continuation of the past three decades. The
Supreme Court will continue to accept an activist approach that sees
the Court as the ultimate arbiter of nearly all constitutional issues. 488
Generally speaking, the Court will modestly limit the powers of
Congress and the states, expand the powers of the President, and limit
the ability of individuals to challenge governmental actions not
directed specifically at them. It will also contract the reach of
individual rights protecting minorities and criminal defendants while
expanding them modestly for women, capital defendants,
homosexuals, and beneficiaries of affirmative action programs.
Finally, it will perhaps expand rights more broadly for property
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562-64 (2005) (quoting Stafford v.
Kentucky, 429 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1989)); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310
(2002) (citing Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312,319 (Va. 2000)); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188,
196 (1986)); Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 858 (1992) (citing
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989)).
486. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701, 792
(2007) (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003)); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 164-65 (2007) (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52,77-79 (1976)); Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,901
(2007) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7
(1984)).
487. RICHARD WOLFFE, RENEGADE: THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT 17-18 (2009).
488. See generally KECK, supra note 14.
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owners, contributors to political campaigns, and gun owners. In
nearly all of these cases, Justice Kennedy's views are likely to be
pivotal in setting the parameters of the Court's doctrine, and he is
likely to resist some of the more absolute formulations of doctrines
urged by Justices Scalia and Thomas.

